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ment saving plans that are largely managed and controlled by employees
has been the most striking change in retirement saving over the last two
decades. Individual managed and controlled retirement accounts, particu-
larly 401(k) plans but also 403(b) plans for nonproﬁt organizations, 457
plans for state and local employees, the Thrift Savings Plan for federal em-
ployees, Keogh plans for self-employed workers, and Individual Retire-
ment Accounts (IRAs), have grown enormously. Employer-provided de-
ﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pension plans have declined in importance. In 1980, 92
percent of private retirement saving contributions were to employer-based
plans; 64 percent of these contributions were to DB plans. In 1999, about
85 percent of private contributions were to accounts in which individuals
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We consider the changes in the magnitude and the composition of sav-
ing for retirement over the last two decades. We begin with an analysis of
aggregate data on retirement plan contributions. We then turn to micro-
data, describe patterns in these data, and try to reconcile these patterns
with the aggregate data. We document the changes in aggregate retirement
saving over the past twenty-ﬁve years and describe how these changes are
related to the shift from employer-sponsored deﬁned beneﬁt plans to indi-
vidual-controlled retirement saving. We then investigate whether the shift
toward individual retirement saving, and the accumulation of retirement
assets in these accounts, has been oﬀset by a reduction in the assets in other
retirement saving plans.
In a series of earlier papers, summarized in Poterba, Venti, and Wise
(hereafter PVW, 1996, 1998b), we found large net saving eﬀects of IRAs and
401(k)s. We emphasized the potential oﬀsets between saving in self-directed
retirement accounts, other forms of ﬁnancial asset saving, and the accumu-
lation of home equity. On balance we found little, if any, oﬀset in these cases.
More recently, Benjamin (2003) and Pence (2001) have also found little or
no oﬀset between 401(k) contributions and non-401(k) ﬁnancial asset sav-
ing, although the latter study also found little evidence that 401(k)s in-
creased total wealth. Recent work by Engen and Gale (2000) ﬁnds little
oﬀset among low earners, but more substantial oﬀsets among high earners.
Much less attention has been directed to the possible oﬀset of personal
retirement assets by a reduction in the assets in DB pension plans. Engen,
Gale, and Scholz (1994) found a negative relationship between participa-
tion in DB pension plans and 401(k) plan assets in the 1987 and 1991 Sur-
veys of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Papke (1999) concluded
that between 1985 and 1992 about one-ﬁfth of ongoing sponsors of DB
plans terminated their plans and adopted or retained a conventional de-
ﬁned contribution (DC) or a 401(k) plan. It is not clear from her analysis,
however, whether the growth in 401(k) plans displaced DB plans. Papke,
Petersen, and Poterba (1996) surveyed ﬁrms with 401(k)s and found that
very few had terminated a preexisting DB plan when they instituted their
401(k) plan. Their sample, however, may not have been representative of
the broader population of ﬁrms.
More recently, Ippolito and Thompson (2000) combined Form 5500
data with information from the Pension Beneﬁt Guarantee Corporation
(PBGC) to study within-ﬁrm changes in plans over time. They found little
ﬁrm-level displacement of DB plans by 401(k) plans, and concluded that
the replacement of a DB plan by a 401(k) is rare. Engelhardt (2000), bas-
ing his ﬁndings on data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), con-
cludes that households eligible for a 401(k) have higher non-DB assets than
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DB wealth is included. He interprets this as evidence of ﬁrm-level substi-
tution of 401(k)s for DB pensions. However, as we explain later, the HRS
does not allow accurate categorization of individuals into 401(k) eligible
and noneligible status.
Most recently, LeBlanc (2001) has estimated the reduction in contribu-
tions to the Registered Retirement Saving Program (RRSP) in Canada
when persons are newly covered by an employer-provided DB plan. Based
on a longitudinal panel of individual tax data, and using a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence estimation procedure, he ﬁnds that for a dollar of DB plan sav-
ing, RRSP contributions are reduced by only about $0.15.
Our analysis of these issues is divided into six sections. In section 1.1 we
consider aggregate data on the total stock of retirement wealth. The very
large increase in total retirement assets relative to income over the past
twenty-ﬁve years strongly suggests that the enormous growth in individual
retirement assets has more than oﬀset any displacement of asset growth in
traditional DB pension plans.
In section 1.2 we show that the “retirement plan contribution rate” is
much greater than the personal saving rate reported in the National In-
come and Product Accounts (NIPA) in recent years. Our retirement plan
contribution rate is determined by the retirement saving of current em-
ployees. The NIPA saving rate, in contrast, depends on the saving and con-
sumption patterns of retirees as well as those who are currently working.
We document the substantial growth over time in contributions to self-
directed retirement saving programs, such as 401(k) plans. We also suggest
that the retirement plan contribution rate was reduced by legislation re-
stricting contributions to DB pension plans, as well as by the strong stock
market performance of the late 1980s and 1990s and the associated reduc-
tion in required DB plan contributions.
In section 1.3, we distinguish between retirement saving from the stand-
point of an employee, and employer contributions to retirement saving
plans. We argue that from the perspective of the employee, 401(k) retire-
ment saving is likely to be much greater than traditional DB plan saving at
most ages. We use data on accruing DB plan liabilities to compare 401(k)
and DB plan saving rates, and conclude that the saving rate under a typi-
cal 401(k) plan is about twice that under a typical DB plan.
In section 1.4 we begin to explore the possible substitution between
diﬀerent types of retirement plans. We use data from both the Department
of Labor Form 5500 ﬁlings, and from the SIPP. We ﬁnd no evidence of
strong substitution patterns between 401(k) participation and other retire-
ment plans. Section 1.5 shows that further analysis of substitution, using
data from the HRS, supports the results in section 1.4.
A brief conclusion summarizes our ﬁndings.
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1.1.1 Retirement Account Assets
While it is not possible to link particular assets with particular motives
for saving, for many households assets in retirement saving accounts are
the best single indicator of the amount that they have saved for retirement.
A number of factors are likely to contribute to variation in retirement as-
sets. For example, one would expect that households with higher earnings
would have more retirement assets. For a given level of aggregate earnings,
a larger share of the working population near retirement age is likely to be
associated with greater retirement assets. Variation in life expectancy and
in the typical retirement age can also aﬀect the stock of retirement assets.
The “adequacy” of any given level of assets depends on the years of sup-
port the assets are expected to provide.
Our analysis begins with measures of aggregate retirement assets that
are not adjusted for demographic trends. We then explain the likely eﬀect
of adjustment for demographic changes. Figure 1.1 shows the ratio of as-
sets in all private retirement accounts—including DB plans, 401(k), other
DC plans, IRAs, 403(b) plans, and Keogh plans—to private wage and
salary earnings.1 This ratio increased more than ﬁvefold between 1975 and
1998, from 0.39 to 2.02. The ﬁgure shows modest growth in the ratio of re-
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1. Appendix A describes all of our data sources.
Fig. 1.1 Ratio of private and total retirement assets to wage and salary earningstirement assets to earnings through 1981; more rapid growth between 1982
and 1994, after the introduction of IRAs and 401(k) plans and during a pe-
riod of positive stock market returns; and rapidly accelerated growth be-
ginning in 1995, corresponding to large increases in equity market returns.
Figure 1.1 also shows the ratio of assets in all retirement plans, the private
plans as well as public sector plans, to wages and salaries. The trend is very
similar to that for private plan assets alone.
Figure 1.2 shows private retirement assets disaggregated into several
components. It shows that assets in DB plans continued to grow after the
introduction of 401(k) and IRA plans, but that the bulk of the gain was in
individual accounts. In this ﬁgure, 401(k) assets are included with other
DC plans. There is no evidence of a decline in the assets in conventional
employer-provided plans during the time period when assets in individual
accounts were growing most rapidly.
The foregoing data alone cannot rule out the possibility of substitution,
because we do not have data on the time path that other retirement plan
assets would have followed in the absence of the growth in DC assets. To
place the growth in DC assets into perspective, however, we note that if all
contributions to personal retirement accounts between 1985 and 1998 had
come at the expense of DB contributions, DB assets would have grown by
a factor of 8.4 instead of 2.7.
The private retirement assets in ﬁgure 1.2 exclude assets in federal, state,
The Transition to Personal Accounts and Increasing Retirement Wealth 21
Fig. 1.2 Private retirement assetsand local retirement plans, and assets held by life insurance companies in
retirement plans that are also part of the retirement asset pool.2 Figure 1.3
shows the assets in private plans as well as the assets in these other plans.
In 1999, about 40 percent of all retirement assets were in federal, state, and
local and insurance plan funds.
Retirement account assets support current retirees as well as future re-
tirees. Although we are unable to distinguish the assets held by current re-
tirees from those held by the working-age population, we suspect that the
increase in these assets represents a large upward trend in the assets of fu-
ture retirees.
1.1.2 Housing and Other Nonretirement Assets
Aside from promised Social Security beneﬁts, housing equity is the most
important asset of a large fraction of Americans. Unlike the increase in re-
tirement account assets, however, there has been no increase in housing
equity relative to income over the past two and one-half decades. Figure 1.4
shows housing equity as a fraction of disposable income from 1975 to 1998.
The ratio increased about 25 percent between 1975 and 1989, but by 1999
it was essentially at the same level as in 1975. The ﬁgure also shows non-
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2. The Flow of Funds Accounts (FFA) deﬁnes the latter series as including “assets of
private pension plans held at life insurance companies, such as guaranteed investment con-
tracts and variable annuity plans, that are managed for the beneﬁt of individuals who are not
separately identiﬁed to the insurance companies.”
Fig. 1.3 Public and private retirement assetsretirement, nonhome equity net worth as a share of disposable income.
This ratio decreased and then increased between 1985 and 1999. The in-
crease between 1975 and 1999, 27 percent, was not nearly as great as the in-
crease in retirement assets over this period.
1.1.3 Retirement Assets and Demographic Trends
The growth of retirement assets relative to income may be explained by
a number of changes. These include the advent of new retirement saving ve-
hicles as well as other factors, such as demographic change. Changes in
three features of the population—demographic composition, mortality
rates, and labor force participation—have likely contributed to the rise in
retirement assets relative to income. We describe each of these changes, al-
though we do not attempt a formal adjustment of retirement wealth to cor-
rect for these changes.
The increase in life expectancy at retirement age is the ﬁrst substantial
change that may have contributed to rising retirement assets. In 1975, life
expectancy for a U.S. man at age sixty-two was 15.5 years, while that for a
woman was 20.3 years. By 1997, male life expectancy at age sixty-two had
increased to 17.6 years, while female life expectancy had risen to 21.4 years.
For men, this implies a 13.5 percent increase in the number of years that
need to be supported with retirement resources, beginning at age sixty-two.
For women, the change was 5.4 percent. These proportional changes pro-
vide a crude measure—crude, because they do not reﬂect the potential role
of risk and the prospect of drawing down resources too quickly—of the in-
crease in retirement resources that would be needed to oﬀset improved
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Fig. 1.4 Ratio of home equity and other assets to disposable incomelongevity. These changes might account for an increase in resources of
roughly 10 percent, much less than the actual growth of retirement assets
relative to income.
The second important demographic change that might have contributed
to rising retirement assets was the aging of the labor force. Translating in-
formation on the age structure of the population into predictions about the
wealth-income ratio requires detailed information on saving by age, yet
there is no agreement on the relative importance of life-cycle, precaution-
ary, and other factors in saving decisions. In 1975, the average age of those
over the age of twenty in the U.S. population was 44.6 years. For men, the
average age was 43.9 years. Between 1975 and 1985, the average age of
those over twenty actually declined to 44.3 years for the entire population
and 43.5 years for the male population. This reﬂected the entry of the
“baby boom” cohorts into the 20-plus age group. By 1998, the working age
population had grown older, the average age of all 20-plus persons was 45.5
years, and that of 20-plus men was 44.8 years. Thus between 1985 and
1998, the average age of the adult population rose by just over one year.
Similarly, the average age of those in the labor force in 1985 was 38.5 years,
whereas in 1998, it was 40.3 years.
These data on the population and labor force age structure suggest that
by the late 1990s, those who were in their earning years were older and had
fewer remaining years of work to accumulate assets for retirement than
those in the working population in the 1970s and early 1980s. This also may
have induced a rise in retirement assets.
The ﬁnal change that may have aﬀected retirement assets is the shifting
age of retirement in the U.S. population. During the 1980s and 1990s,
these changes were modest by comparison to earlier decades. Burtless
and Quinn (2000) present detailed information on age-speciﬁc labor
force participation rates for U.S. men in 1970, 1984–85, and 1998–89.
Their data show a sharp decline in labor force participation rates between
1970 and 1984–85, but relatively little decline subsequently. The partici-
pation rates for 1998–99 were virtually identical to those in 1984–85. At
ages above sixty-ﬁve, the labor force participation rate in the late 1990s
was greater than that in the mid-1980s. There is no systematic diﬀerence
in labor force participation rates at younger ages. Labor force participa-
tion rates for women in their early sixties increased between the mid-
1980s and the late 1990s as cohorts of women with greater labor force
participation rates when they were younger entered the retirement-age
cohort.
Changes in retirement ages are therefore not likely to account for sub-
stantial changes in retirement wealth relative to income during the last two
decades. Demographic factors—shifting age structure and lengthening life
expectancy—seem likely to account for modest increases in retirement as-
sets, but are unlikely to account for more than a small fraction of the large
changes we observe.
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B
Fig. 1.5 A, Private pension contributions; B, all pension contributions
1.2 Plan Contributions and the Retirement Plan Contribution Rate
The accumulation of retirement assets depends on the inﬂow of contri-
butions, the payout of beneﬁts, and the return on invested assets. Panel A
of ﬁgure 1.5 shows private pension plan contributions, which increased al-
most sixfold between 1975 and 1999, while panel B of ﬁgure 1.5 shows con-tributions to all retirement plans. Neither of the series includes contribu-
tions to privately held pension plans administered by insurance compa-
nies, which hold about 9 percent of the assets in all pension plans. Private
plans include self-directed plans such as 401(k) plans and IRAs. IRA con-
tributions exclude rollovers, while IRA assets include assets rolled in to
these accounts.
The pronounced “hump” in retirement plan contributions between 1982
and 1986 corresponds to the beginning and subsequent retrenchment of
the IRA program. The pattern strongly suggests that IRA contributions
during this period were not oﬀset by a reduction in other forms of retire-
ment saving. Indeed, the rate of increase of non-IRA retirement saving was
the same in the 1982–85 period as in prior years. This pattern suggests that
the total pool of assets in retirement plans likely would be much greater to-
day if the IRA program had not been limited in 1986.
Panel A of ﬁgure 1.6 shows both private and total retirement plan con-
tributions scaled by disposable income. Panel B of ﬁgure 1.6 shows plan
contributions over wage and salary earnings. In both ﬁgures, private con-
tributions are scaled by private earnings, while all contributions are scaled
by all wage and salary earnings. We deﬁne these ratios as retirement plan
contribution rates. They measure the proportion of current earnings that is
saved in retirement accounts by current employees. The contribution rates
do not account for retirement plan earnings on existing assets, or for with-
drawals from these plans. In the following, we compare retirement plan
contribution rates to NIPA national saving rates.
Panels A and B of ﬁgure 1.6 show that retirement plan contribution rates
are remarkably stable over most of the period. Scaled by personal dispos-
able income, the private plan contribution rate was about 3.5 percent in
1975 and in 1999, and the contribution rate for all plans varied between 5
and 6 percent for most of the period. When scaled by private and by all wage
and salary earnings, the contribution rates are also stable, although they are
greater than the rates scaled by personal disposable income. The retirement
plan contribution rate for all plans, including those in the federal and state
and local government sector, is near 8 percent for most of the period, or
about 2 percentage points higher than the rate for the private sector alone.
The relative stability in the retirement plan contribution rates was bro-
ken only by the large increase in the plan contribution rate when the IRA
program was initiated, and the decrease when the program was curtailed in
1986. For example, relative to earnings, both the private and the all plan
rates are about 2 percentage points higher during the IRA period—over 8
and 10 percent, respectively.
1.2.1 Time Series Changes in the Retirement Plan Contribution Rate
The relative stability of the retirement plan contribution rate conceals
ﬂuctuations in some of the factors that aﬀect this rate. Contributions to
private DC type plans increased sharply over the 1975–99 period, while DB
26 James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wisecontributions varied widely. At the end of this period, DB plan contribu-
tions were only slightly higher than at the beginning.
Retirement plan contributions are the product of the number of partici-
pants and the average contribution per participant. Figure 1.7 shows the
sum of the number of active participants in all DB and DC plans.3 It illus-
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Fig. 1.6 A, Ratio of private and total pension contributions to disposable income;
B, ratio of private and total pension contributions to wage and salary earnings
3. These data, from Form 5500 ﬁlings and IRS tabulations of tax returns, show the number
of persons participating in each type of retirement saving plan. Many persons participate intrates in particular the rapid growth of 401(k) plans. The number of par-
ticipants in these plans, which ﬁrst became available in 1982, grew to al-
most 38 million by 1997. While 401(k) plan participation grew in the 1980s
and 1990s, participation in DB plans declined from about 30 million in
1984 to about 23 million by 1997. Participation in non-401(k) DC plans
increased until about 1986 and then declined, ending the period about 30
percent higher than at the beginning. There is a clear “IRA eﬀect” on plan
participants, as well as plan contributions, in the early 1980s. In total, the
number of plan participants increased from about 39 million in 1975 to
over 80 million in 1997.
Panel A of ﬁgure 1.8 shows contributions per participant in DB, DC,
and 401(k) plans. Panel B of ﬁgure 1.8 shows IRA and 401(k) contribu-
tions, while panel C of ﬁgure 1.8 shows contributions to Keogh plans. DB
contributions per participant ﬂuctuated substantially during the last two
decades, and they were about 40 percent higher at the end of the period
than at the beginning. Non-401(k) DC contributions per participant in-
creased about twofold over the period, and on average were higher than
DB contributions. Over the past ﬁfteen years contributions per participant
to 401(k) plans were, on average, twice as large as contributions per par-
ticipant to DB plans. Contributions to 401(k)s increased almost 50 percent
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more than one plan, so the total number of participants overstates the number of persons who
participate in at least one plan. For 401(k) plans, participants include all persons eligible to
contribute, regardless of actual contributions.
Fig. 1.7 Active participants in private pension plans (with double counting)between 1982 and 1996 alone.4 During the “unrestricted” IRA period,
1982–86, IRA contributions on average were greater than 401(k) contri-
butions.
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Fig. 1.8 A, Contributions per active participant DB, DC, and 401(k); B, contribu-
tions per active participant IRA and 401(k); C, contributions per active 
participant Keogh
4. 401(k) contributions are calculated by dividing total contributions to 401(k) plans by the
total number of employees eligible to contribute, not the number that actually make contribu-
tions.There is much less change during this period in the participation rate of 401(k) eligibles,
conditional on eligibility, than in the eligibility rate. Most of the change in the number of con-
tributors is therefore due to changes in eligibility.Keogh contributions, although a small proportion of total retirement
saving, increased enormously between the early 1980s and late 1990s.
There is a rise of more than 200 percent between 1981 and 1986, when the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 raised Keogh contribution limits
from $7,500 to $15,000.
Figure 1.9 shows the trend in the number of participants in all plans
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C
Fig. 1.8 (cont.) A, Contributions per active participant DB, DC, and 401(k); B,
contributions per active participant IRA and 401(k); C, contributions per active
participant Keogh
Fig. 1.9 Participants and contributions per participant for all planscombined and the trend in average contributions per participant. These
two trends together yield the increase in total contributions previously
shown. The participation numbers reﬂect substantial double counting, be-
cause many individuals participate in more than one plan. The increase in
average contributions per unique covered employee would be substantially
higher than the increase shown in ﬁgure 1.9.
1.2.2 Deﬁned Beneﬁt Contributions and the 
Retirement Plan Contribution Rate
Figure 1.10 shows an index of DB plan contributions per participant. It
also shows an index for the number of participants and the ﬂow of contri-
butions to these plans. There are at least three reasons for the erratic vari-
ation in contributions to DB plans. The ﬁrst is the slight rise and then
steady decline in the number of active participants (current employees) in
DB plans over the 1975–98 period. The number of total participants, in-
cluding retirees, rose throughout the period.
A second is the link between returns on DB plan assets and current fund-
ing decisions. Beneﬁts promised by DB plans are prescribed by a formula,
which is typically based on years of service and ﬁnal salary. The promised
beneﬁts are a liability of the ﬁrm, and the ﬁrm must insure that assets held
in the plan are suﬃcient to cover this liability. Other things being equal, a
rise in investment returns increases DB asset balances relative to obliga-
tions, thereby reducing the need for additional contributions. Bernheim
and Shoven (1988) discuss this feature of DB funding.
A third reason for the ﬂuctuation in DB contributions is the series of leg-
islative changes that limited the level of beneﬁts that could be funded un-
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Fig. 1.10 DB contributions, participants, and contributions per participant (index:
1977   1)der DB plans and discouraged ﬁrms from overfunding their pension plans.
Prior to 1986, ﬁrms could fund their DB plans to a level greater than their
legal liability. A series of laws beginning with a 10 percent reversion tax,
which was part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, put stricter limits on fund-
ing. Ippolito (2001) estimates that in the absence of various funding re-
strictions, DB pension assets in 1995 would have been 28 percent higher.
Schieber and Shoven (1997) report that when the limits on contributions to
overfunded plans that were part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1987 took eﬀect, 48 percent of a sample of large pension plans were
precluded from making further contributions.
Our analysis of DB contributions, relative to contributions to other
plans, is directed at understanding how ﬂuctuations in DB contributions
aﬀect the retirement plan contribution rate. Although developing a precise
estimate is an unrealistic target, we try to place a lower bound on the eﬀect
of movements in DB plan contributions on the retirement plan contribu-
tion rate.
Total DB contributions are the product of the number of DB plan par-
ticipants and the average contribution per participant. Fluctuations are
due largely to movements in the contribution per participant. Figure 1.11
provides information on DB, DC, and Keogh contributions per partici-
pant over the 1975–97 period. It shows that the wages of wage and salary
workers increased 150 percent over this period. The DC plan contributions
per participant increased about 150 percent as well, as one would expect if
contributions were a proportion of wage earnings. On the other hand, DB
contributions per participant ﬂuctuated substantially and on average fell
relative to wages.
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Fig. 1.11 Contributions per participant (index: 1977   1)Suppose that there had been no legislation limiting contributions to DB
plans, that market returns had not aﬀected DB contributions, that life ex-
pectancy at retirement had been constant, and that there were no changes
in the demographic structure of the workforce covered by DB plans. If the
returns on DB plan assets were in line with expectations, one might have
expected DB contributions per participant, relative to wages, to remain
roughly constant. Given rising life expectancy and an aging workforce, one
might have expected contributions per employee to increase relative to
wages.
To explore the eﬀects of legislative and return-induced downward pres-
sures on DB plan contributions, we construct a “what if” scenario. Consid-
ering the private sector only, suppose that DB contributions per employee
had increased at the same rate as wages in every year after 1977. Figure 1.12
shows the private retirement plan contribution rate under this counterfac-
tual, together with the actual rate. The saving rate under this counterfactual
assumption was 1 percentage point higher than the actual rate at the end of
the period. In the years when the DB contribution rate was at its lowest, the
counterfactual saving rate was close to 2 percentage points higher than the
actual rate. This counterfactual suggests that legislative changes like those
in 1986, and unexpectedly favorable returns on DB plan assets, probably re-
duced the private retirement plan contribution rate by a substantial amount.
The aggregate data also suggest that the retirement plan contribution
rate would have been substantially higher were it not for the curtailment of
the IRA program. Between 1982 and 1985, IRA saving added approxi-
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Fig. 1.12 Ratio of private and DB adjusted pension contributions to wage and
salary earningsmately 2.3 percentage points to the retirement plan contribution rate. Now
it accounts for only 0.3 percentage points.
In summary, aggregate retirement assets increased dramatically over the
past two decades. All else being equal, this reduces the likelihood that the
rise of assets in DC retirement plans was oﬀset by a reduction of assets in
DB plans. This conclusion is consistent with the ﬁndings in previous stud-
ies using household data, which show increases in individual ﬁnancial as-
sets with the advent of 401(k) and IRA plans, and with the evidence that
we present later. The decline in DB plans was probably due to many factors
other than the growth of DC plans. Gustman and Steinmeier (1992), for
example, ﬁnd that at least half of the trend in DB plans from 1977 to 1985
“is due to a shift in employment mix towards ﬁrms with industry, size, and
union status that have historically been associated with lower deﬁned bene-
ﬁt rates.” Ippolito (1995) concludes that “about half of the shift is attribut-
able to a loss of employment in large unionized ﬁrms where DB plans are
used intensively.”
1.2.3 NIPA Saving and the Retirement Plan Contribution Rate
Contributions to retirement plans as a proportion of either wages and
salaries or personal disposable income have substantially exceeded the
NIPA personal saving rate in recent years. In the NIPA, saving equals dis-
posable income, less consumption. This deﬁnition implies that increases in
measured income increase saving, and increases in measured consumption
decrease saving. Contributions to pension plans are treated as income in
the NIPAs, so these contributions increase saving. Interest and dividends
received by pension plans are also imputed as a component of income, and
pension plan management fees are charged as a consumption outlay.
Neither capital gains on pension assets, nor distributions from pension
plans, are included in NIPA income. If distributions from pension plans
are partly consumed, however, the net eﬀect of pension distributions will
be to raise consumption and therefore, without any corresponding in-
crease in income, to reduce NIPA saving.
The NIPA treatment of pensions can be illustrated with an example.
Consider an employee who contributed to a 401(k) plan in 1982. Assum-
ing that the contribution was made from income earned in that year, and
reduced the contributor’s consumption in 1982, the act of contributing
would have raised personal saving in 1982. If the 401(k) assets were in-
vested in non-dividend paying stocks, the internal buildup in their value
would not have contributed anything to NIPA income in any year after
1982, until the date of distribution.5 Assume that the assets were distrib-
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5. The U.S. Department of Labor (1999) reports that in 1996, interest and dividends on
401(k) assets totaled $20.7 billion, while contributions were $104 billion and capital gains
were $129.3 billion.uted from the 401(k) plan in 2001. At that point, there would be no increase
in NIPA income. If the beneﬁciary of the distributions raised consumption
as a result of these distributions, the net eﬀect would be higher consumer
spending and, therefore, lower saving. With large capital gains between
1982 and 2001, the distribution is likely to be very large relative to the ini-
tial contribution in 1982. Lusardi, Skinner, and Venti (2001) estimate that
in 1999, the NIPA accounting of DB pension transactions alone reduced
NIPA personal saving by almost $55 billion. Figures 1.13 and 1.14 show
that in recent years, distributions from DB plans and IRAs have far ex-
ceeded contributions to these plans.6
The growth in retirement plan assets during the last decade highlights
the limitations of the current NIPA treatment of pension saving. Gale and
Sabelhaus (1999) and Reinsdorf and Perozek (2002) discuss limitations of
the current deﬁnition of personal saving other than those associated with
pensions. The distortions in the NIPA personal saving rate that result from
the treatment of pension income will only become worse in the future.
PVW (2001), for example, project that average 401(k) balances for the co-
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Fig. 1.13 DB contributions and beneﬁts
6. Until 2000, the treatment of public pensions in NIPA was almost the reverse of the treat-
ment of private pensions. Employee contributions to the federal civilian retirement plan, state
and local pension plans, and Social Security were not included in income, while beneﬁts from
these plans were counted as income. Employee contributions thus reduced saving. If beneﬁts
were fully spent, the resulting increase in consumption would precisely oﬀset the increase in
income associated with the beneﬁts and saving would not be aﬀected. Since 2000, public and
private pensions are treated the same in the NIPA.hort retiring in 2025 will be roughly ten times greater than the balances for
those who retired in the mid-1990s.
1.3 Retirement Plan Contributions versus Employee Saving
In this section we compare lifetime saving under an illustrative DB plan
to that under a DC plan. We show that the pattern of retirement asset ac-
cumulation under the two plans is very diﬀerent, and we note that an em-
ployee’s perception of retirement saving under the two plans is likely to be
very diﬀerent as well. In addition, the early retirement incentives inherent
in many DB plans suggest that DB plan participants will retire earlier than
DC participants, and thereby will accumulate less in retirement assets. We
then discuss implications of these ﬁndings for the comparison of individual
assets in DB and DC plans, as well as the aggregate accumulation of pen-
sion assets, and consider empirical evidence on asset accrual in DB plans.
1.3.1 Contributions versus Saving: A Conceptual Framework
Contributions to traditional non-401(k) DC plans are typically a con-
stant percentage of employee earnings and are primarily funded by em-
ployer contributions. Contributions to 401(k) programs are also propor-
tional to earnings, but the precise relationship between earnings and
contributions depends on each ﬁrm’s match rate and contribution limit, as
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Fig. 1.14 IRA contributions and beneﬁtswell as on the saving choices of participants. About one-third of all 401(k)
contributions are made by employers and two-thirds by participants.
In both 401(k) plans and other types of DC plans, contributions by em-
ployers and employees are easily observed by participants, making it un-
likely that there are any diﬀerences between contributions to these plans
and the amounts individuals perceive as “saved.” This is not true for saving
through DB plans. The annual DB saving that can be ascribed to a given
plan participant may be very diﬀerent from the employer contribution per
participant. The amount a DB plan participant perceivesto be saved on his
or her behalf may be very diﬀerent from the actual saving, as well as from
the employer contribution to the plan.
Similarly, a participant’s DB pension wealth is not easily observed and
is diﬃcult to determine. It is the discounted value of promised future ben-
eﬁts accrued to date. The annual personal DB saving rate is the change in
promised beneﬁts associated with working another year under the DB
plan.7 Because most DB plans are “backloaded,” this annual beneﬁt ac-
crual is typically very small for young workers and much larger for older
workers, particularly as they approach the plan’s early retirement age.
Unless the speciﬁc features of a DB plan are known, it is not possible to
calculate saving rates at diﬀerent ages under the plan. This makes it diﬃ-
cult to compare personal saving—from the perspective of the partici-
pant—under DB and DC plans. We present a simple framework to ﬁx
these ideas and to compare DC and DB saving rates.
For a person covered by a DB plan, saving is deﬁned in terms of prom-
ised future retirement beneﬁts. The increment to future retirement wealth
is the change in accrued future beneﬁts associated with working another
year at the ﬁrm. Current saving is the present value of this accrual. Deﬁned
beneﬁt saving is deﬁned by a formula that determines beneﬁts in the future,
whereas DC saving is deﬁned by the current contribution. In a DC plan,
the increment to future retirement wealth is determined by the future value
of the current contribution, which depends on the intervening rate of re-
turn on the plan assets.
In a simpliﬁed case, DB beneﬁts are given by Bt    W ts, where   is a pa-
rameter of the plan, typically between 0.01 and 0.02, and W t denotes earn-
ings at age t, and s is the number of years of service that the employee has
at age t. After s years of employment, this is the accrued beneﬁt promised
at the normal retirement age, say sixty-ﬁve. If the employee leaves the ﬁrm
after s years, future beneﬁts at retirement are given by this formula. The
change in B with another year of employment is given by
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7. The measure of accrued DB pension wealth that we use corresponds to the ﬁrm’s cur-
rent, or terminal, liability. Firms also compute projected liabilities, which use a forecast of fu-
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where wis the annual rate of increase in earnings. The change in future pen-
sion wealth is given by this change in beneﬁts, multiplied by the annuity
value of a dollar at the retirement age of sixty-ﬁve, A(65). Thus in the DB
case, the increase in future retirement wealth associated with working an-
other year is  DBPW   (ws   1)   W t       A(65). Saving at age t under the
DB plan, which can be compared to DC saving at age t, is this amount dis-
counted back to age t. This accrual is an increase in the DB plan obligation
that must be funded by the employer.
The ratio of the change in future retirement wealth associated with
working another year under the DC plan to the change in wealth from































    




Note that  DCPW depends on the market rate of return but not on the rate
of increase in the wage rate, which aﬀects  DBPW. The market rate of re-
turn may aﬀect  DBPW through the A(65) term. Suppose that   .015,
that k   .10, and that A(65)   8. Suppose also that people work from age
twenty-ﬁve to age sixty-ﬁve. Then the ratio  DCPW/ DBPW is [(1  
r)65–t/(1   ws)]   [.10/.12]. Suppose further that r   0.09 and w   0.05. At
one year of employment the ratio is 20.04, at twenty years it is 2.05, and at
forty years it is 0.24. Deﬁned contribution wealth accrues early in the
working life and DB wealth accrues late—it is backloaded.
Most actual DB plans are not as simple as the one previously consid-
ered. Actual accruals depend on the speciﬁc provisions of the DB plan. An
employee is usually not vested in the plan before working some minimum
number of years.8 Deﬁned beneﬁt saving is zero prior to vesting. In addi-
tion, most DB plans have an early retirement age (often ﬁfty-ﬁve), which is
an important determinant of the accrual pattern. After the early retire-
ment age, beneﬁt accrual typically declines (often becoming negative), cre-
ating an incentive to retire early. The more complicated accrual patterns
under these circumstances, and the associated incentives to retire, are de-
scribed in detail in Kotlikoﬀ and Wise (1987, 1988, 1989a, 1989b). Lazear
(1985) proposed that ﬁrms use these incentives to induce older workers—
paid more than their marginal product—to retire. In the following illus-
tration we use a typical plan, similar to a plan described in Kotlikoﬀ and
Wise (1989b), that incorporates a substantial incentive to retire after the
early retirement age.
kW t(1   r)65–t
   
(ws   1)W t    A(65)
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8. This is also true for some 401(k) plans in which the employer matching contribution is
subject to a short vesting requirement.Suppose the DB plan has vesting after ﬁve years of service, early retire-
ment at age ﬁfty-ﬁve, normal retirement at age sixty-ﬁve, and an early re-
tirement discount factor of 3 percent per year. The factor   is set at 0.013.
Table 1.1 shows saving at selected ages under this DB plan and under a
401(k) plan with a 9 percent contribution rate. In this example, the nomi-
nal rate of growth of earnings declines from 7 percent per year at age
twenty-ﬁve to 1 percent at age sixty-ﬁve. These earnings should be thought
of as the historical earnings of persons now approaching retirement. The
associated saving should be thought of as the saving of workers covered un-
der the DB or the 401(k) plan over a working lifetime.9 The table shows
three measures of saving: saving as a proportion of earnings at age t (col-
umns 3 and 4), saving in dollars at age t (columns 5 and 6), and the associ-
ated increment to wealth at age sixty-ﬁve (columns 7 through 10).
Table 1.1, column (4) shows 401(k) plan saving as a percent of earnings.
At age twenty-ﬁve, for example, 9 percent of earnings is contributed to a
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Table 1.1 Illustration of Saving under DB and 401(k) Plans
Saving as Increment to Wealth
at Retirement
Saving/Wage Saving in Dollars
401(k) 401(k) 401(k)
Age Wage DB 401(k) DB 401(k) DB to 65 to 55 to 60
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
25 9,229 0 0.09 0 831 0 26,089 11,020 16,956
29 11,991 0.053 0.09 636 1,079 5,973 24,012 10,143 15,606
30 12,754 0.016 0.09 207 1,148 1,640 23,433 9,898 15,230
35 16,983 0.029 0.09 494 1,528 2,539 20,279 8,566 13,180
40 21,784 0.049 0.09 1,063 1,961 3,552 16,906 7,141 10,988
45 26,908 0.078 0.09 2,097 2,422 4,554 13,572 5,733 8,821
50 31,998 0.119 0.09 3,809 2,880 5,376 10,490 4,431 6,818
54 35,757 0.162 0.09 5,782 3,218 5,782 8,304 3,508 5,397
55 36,623 –0.046 0.09 –1,672 3,296 –1,672 7,803 3,296 5,071
60 40,330 –0.118 0.09 –4,765 3,630 –4,765 5,585 — 3,630
64 42,363 –0.189 0.09 –8,016 3,813 –8,016 4,156 — —
Average
25–64 0.017 0.09 111 2,425 — 14,768 — —
25–54 0.062 0.09 1,730 2,025 3,549 — 7,535 —
Total pension wealth 
if retire at age:
55 102,911 — 221,182
60 142,139 — — 362,205
65 181,458 575,970 — —
Source: Authors’ calculations.
9. Workers now approaching retirement could only have been covered by a 401(k) plan for
about two decades.DC account. The dollar amount, $831, is shown in column (6). At a 9 per-
cent market rate of return, the $831 would grow to $26,089 by age sixty-
ﬁve, as shown in column (8). At age forty-ﬁve, 9 percent of earnings is
$2,422, and this amount grows to $13,572 by age sixty-ﬁve. The total ac-
cumulation of assets under the DC plan will be $575,970 by age sixty-ﬁve,
if the employee continues to work and to make contributions until that age.
This value is shown in the last row of column (8). Columns (9) and (10)
show the increment to assets at retirement if the employee works until ages
ﬁfty-ﬁve and sixty, respectively. The total accumulation of assets at these
ages is $221,182 and $362,205, respectively.
The calculation of saving under the DB plan is more complicated. There
is no saving in the DB plan until the employee is vested, which occurs at age
thirty. Much more important are the provisions that determine pension ac-
crual at later ages. Like the typical DB plan, the provisions of the DB plan
used in this illustration discourage work past the early retirement age of
ﬁfty-ﬁve,10 while providing a strong incentive to stay at the ﬁrm until the
early retirement age. Indeed, the accrual of pension beneﬁts is negative af-
ter age ﬁfty-ﬁve. Figure 1.15shows this accrual pattern (saving) and the re-
lated incentive eﬀects.
In this plan, the value of future DB pension beneﬁts is maximized if re-
ceipt of beneﬁts begins at age ﬁfty-ﬁve. Consider, for example, saving at age
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10. The HRS data show that 29.8 percent of all workers qualify for early retirement before
age ﬁfty-ﬁve, another 44.7 percent are eligible at exactly age ﬁfty-ﬁve, and only 14.8 percent
qualify for early retirement after age sixty. The average early retirement age is 54.2 and the av-
erage age of normal retirement is 61.3. See Gustman and Steinmeier (2000a).
Fig. 1.15 Ratio of DB and 401(k) saving to earningsforty-ﬁve. The increment to promised future pension wealth, shown in col-
umn (7), is $4,554, if receipt of beneﬁts begins at age ﬁfty-ﬁve. After age
ﬁfty-ﬁve, the 3 percent increment in beneﬁts for each year that beneﬁt re-
ceipt is delayed is not enough to oﬀset the receipt of beneﬁts for one fewer
year. For each year beneﬁt receipt is delayed after age ﬁfty-ﬁve, the present
value of retirement beneﬁts declines. This is the common feature of DB
plans that encourages retirement after the early retirement age.
The dollar saving shown in column (5) at age forty-ﬁve is $2,097. This is
the increment to assets at age ﬁfty-ﬁve, discounted back to age forty-ﬁve at
9 percent.11 As a proportion of the wage, DB saving, shown in column (3),
is 7.8 percent at age forty-ﬁve. If the DB employee remained in the ﬁrm un-
til age ﬁfty-ﬁve and then started to receive beneﬁts, the value of lifetime
beneﬁts would be $102,911.
Notice that at age forty-ﬁve, for example, DB saving is only moderately
less than DC saving—$2,097 versus $2,422. Yet the increment to total
wealth at retirement is $4,554 under the DB plan, while it is $13,572 under
the 401(k) plan, assuming that the employee works until age sixty-ﬁve. The
diﬀerence in the increment to wealth at retirement is simply due to the
diﬀerence in the assumed age of receipt of beneﬁts. This is taken to be age
ﬁfty-ﬁve under the DB plan, because that is the age that maximizes bene-
ﬁts under the DB plan. The increment to DC wealth at age ﬁfty-ﬁve (from
saving at forty-ﬁve) is $5,733, as shown in column (9).
Over a working life, the maximum present discounted value of future
DB beneﬁts is achieved if the receipt of beneﬁts begins at age ﬁfty-ﬁve. At
that age, the present value of future beneﬁts is $102,911. Total accumula-
tion in the 401(k) plan at that age is $221,182. Accumulation of assets in
DB and DC plans, assuming retirement at age ﬁfty-ﬁve under both plans,
is shown in ﬁgure 1.16. But if the DC employee continues to work until age
sixty-ﬁve, the accumulation in the DC plan increases to $575,970. The DC
employee continues to make contributions at 9 percent of earnings, and as-
sets accumulated at age ﬁfty-ﬁve continue to grow at 9 percent.
For the DB employee, however, beneﬁts grow much more slowly after the
early retirement age. In our example, the nominal annual DB beneﬁt con-
tinues to increase because of earnings growth and additional years of ser-
vice. In addition, beneﬁts are higher because they will be received for fewer
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11. We realize that in principle the discount rate applied to future DB beneﬁts need not be
the same as the market return earned on DC contributions. However, there is no clear way to
measure the risk under each type of plan, and thus no obvious way to make a risk adjustment
to the discount rates. Employees covered by DC plans face investment risk, but in DB plans
most of this investment risk is borne by employers. Conversely, as a consequence of job
change or job loss, employees covered by DB plans face the risk of losing a large fraction of
the beneﬁts they would accrue without job change. The erosion of beneﬁts that results from
job change is much less severe under DC plans. The average discount rate used by DB plans
in Form 5500 reports was 7.77 percent in 1997. For simplicity in this illustration we let the dis-
count rate equal the assumed rate of return.years, but the increase is not enough to oﬀset the fewer years of beneﬁt re-
ceipt. This is reﬂected in the reduction in DB saving beginning at age ﬁfty-
ﬁve, shown in columns (3), (5), and (7) of table 1.1. The beneﬁt at age ﬁfty-
ﬁve is determined by the promised beneﬁt at age sixty-ﬁve discounted at 3
percent. That is, the adjustment for taking beneﬁts before age sixty-ﬁve—
and thus receiving beneﬁts for more years—is only 3 percent per year.
Thus when the receipt of beneﬁts is delayed, say until age sixty-ﬁve, the
beneﬁt is increased by only 3 percent for each one-year reduction in the
number of years beneﬁts will be received. By age sixty-ﬁve, pension wealth
in age sixty-ﬁve dollars is $181,458. The increase between ages ﬁfty-ﬁve
and sixty-ﬁve is not enough to oﬀset the reduction in the number of years
beneﬁts will be received.
Figure 1.17 shows the accumulations of assets under DB and DC plans,
assuming retirement at age sixty-ﬁve. In current dollars, DB pension
wealth grows by a factor of 1.76 between ages ﬁfty-ﬁve and sixty-ﬁve, while
DC wealth grows by a factor of 2.64. At age ﬁfty-ﬁve, DC assets are 2.12
times as much as DB assets. If employees work to age sixty-ﬁve, DC assets
are 3.17 times as much as DB assets.
The assumption underlying ﬁgure 1.17, that DB plan participants work
until age sixty-ﬁve, will tend to understate the diﬀerence between DB and
401(k) accumulation proﬁles. Given DB incentives to retire early, few em-
ployees covered by DB plans work until age sixty-ﬁve. Stock and Wise
(1990a, 1990b), Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1990, 1992, 1994), Gustman
and Steinmeier (1989, 2000a), and Samwick (1998) present estimates of the
eﬀect of such incentives. Evidence on the early retirement eﬀect of such in-
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Fig. 1.16 DB and 401(k) saving increment to wealth (retirement at age 55)centives in public social security programs around the world is presented
in Gruber and Wise (1998, 1999), Coile and Gruber (2000) present recent
estimates of such incentives in the U.S. Social Security program. Friedberg
and Webb (2000) suggest that compared to a DB plan, a DC plan would in-
crease the retirement age by two years. Samwick and Wise (2003) ﬁnd that
the average annual labor force departure rate for HRS respondents be-
tween ages ﬁfty-ﬁve and sixty is 1.8 percent for persons without a pension
plan, 3 percent for those with a DC plan only, 11.5 percent for persons with
a DB plan only, and 12.1 percent for those with both a DB and a DC plan.
One other factor may lead our calculations to overstate the actual pen-
sion wealth of DB participants. Many employees do not remain under the
same DB plan until the early retirement age, and thus do not accumulate
the working life assets shown in the preceding illustration. The DB wealth
at retirement would be much less if a person were to change jobs several
times.
1.3.2 Implications for Analyzing Pension Assets and Retirement Saving
The previous illustration highlights the diﬀerence in the age proﬁle of as-
set accrual under DB and 401(k) plans, and the fact that 401(k) partici-
pants are likely to work longer than DB participants, thereby accumulat-
ing more pension assets. Thus as larger and larger numbers of employees
accumulate more years of employment under DC plans, retirement plan
assets relative to current earnings are likely to rise.
To link our hypothetical DB-401(k) comparison with the earlier discus-
sion of aggregate pension assets in DB and DC plans, consider a setting in
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Fig. 1.17 DB and 401(k) saving increment to wealth (retirement at age 65)which the potential “working life” is forty years, from ages twenty-ﬁve to
sixty-ﬁve. Assume also that DC participants work the entire forty years,
but DB employees work only thirty years, until age ﬁfty-ﬁve. They are re-
tired for ten of the forty working years. Suppose that the annual DC con-
tribution per participant is C, and that the contribution per participant
(employee) to the DB plan is C/2. Then over the working ages twenty-ﬁve
to sixty-ﬁve, contributions to the DC account will be C   40. But contribu-
tions per participant to the DB plan will be only (C/2)   30, or only 3/8 of
DC contributions. If the DB employees work thirty-ﬁve years, until age
sixty, DB contributions will be 43.75 percent of DC contributions. Thus,
for any given cohort of workers, the accumulation of assets will depend on
not only the contribution per active (working) participant to DC and to
DB plans, but also the number of years over which participants work.12
The DB-401(k) illustration can also help to inform the micro compari-
son of the accumulation of individual pension assets under DB and 401(k)
plans, as discussed later. At age sixty-three, for example, individual (annu-
ity) assets of DB participants are likely to be decreasing, while the assets of
individual DC participants are likely still rising, as long as they are still in
the labor force. Indeed, survey-based estimates of DB pension wealth are
often calculated by capitalizing the survey respondent’s reported annuity
from a DB plan. Consider, for example, the pension assets of two persons
at age sixty-ﬁve, one covered by a DB plan the other by a DC plan. Sup-
pose the DC person just retired, while the DB person retired at age ﬁfty-
ﬁve. Working longer will increase the assets of the DC participant. Because
relatively few employees now near retirement have worked for a long pe-
riod of time under a DC plan, this eﬀect may have only a modest inﬂuence
on current comparisons, like those discussed later. The eﬀect will become
quantitatively more important with the spread of 401(k) plans. Although
we do not have a quantitative estimate of the magnitude of this eﬀect, the
direction seems clear.
1.3.3 Empirical Evidence on Deﬁned Beneﬁt Accruals
versus Contributions
To determine whether averaged over all ages the increase in retirement
support from DC plan saving is greater than that from DB plan saving, we
can consider external data. Kotlikoﬀ and Wise (1989) estimate that con-
tributions to DB plans average 4 to 6 percent of the wage earnings of DB
enrollees. The average 401(k) contribution is about 9 percent of earnings.
The Form 5500 data on contributions per active (working) participant dis-
cussed previously show 401(k) contributions per participant about twice as
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12. Workers who retire earlier also get more leisure. Our focus, however, is on the accumu-
lation of retirement assets, not on the comparison of utility of persons covered by DB and DC
plans.large as DB contributions per participant, and we noted previously that
contributions to DC plans are likely to continue over more years than con-
tributions to DB plans. Assuming that investment returns in the two plans
are similar, the 401(k) plan should provide much greater beneﬁts at ages
such as sixty-ﬁve for persons with similar earnings histories.
We  noted previously that DB plan contributions disproportionately
beneﬁt persons who are covered by the same plan over an entire working
life. Employees who change jobs often will accumulate much less in DB
pension assets, as documented by Kotlikoﬀ and Wise (1989). This conclu-
sion is consistent with the ﬁndings of Samwick and Skinner (1998). They
compare DB and DC plans by running a broad range of earnings histories
through plan provisions from the Pension Provider Supplements to the
1983 and 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances. They ﬁnd that DC plans pro-
vide substantially higher retirement beneﬁts than DB plans.
Form 5500 ﬁlings also provide data that matches closely the DC and DB
annual saving rates (or accruals), as described algebraically above. For an
individual DB plan participant, annual pension saving is the increase in
promised future beneﬁts due to working an additional year under the plan,
not the contribution per participant that the ﬁrm makes to the plan. The
annual accrual of promised DB beneﬁts is reported in Form 5500 data for
all plan employees combined.13 This summary statistic combines employ-
ees of all ages, and thus may be very diﬀerent from the accrual for any in-
dividual employee. Averaged over all DB plans, this accrual can be com-
pared to the average contribution per participant in 401(k) plans.
Table 1.2 shows the DB change in accrued liability per active employee
for 1990 through 1997, together with 401(k) contributions per participant.
These data suggest that over these years the annual 401(k) saving rate per
active (working) participant was more than twice the annual average DB
saving rate. While the values reported in the Form 5500 data are imper-
fect—they depend on interest rate and mortality assumptions, and the re-
sponse rate is low—the accrual values per employee correspond rather
closely to contributions per employee in all years but 1993, when the DB
contribution per employee was unusually large ($2,074). Thus contribu-
tions per employee, average accrued liability per employee, and the esti-
mates of total DB versus 401(k) contributions as a percent of wages all
seem quite consistent.
The annual accrual under DB plans is the increase in promised future
beneﬁts that the plan sponsor must fund. If the plan cannot be over- or un-
derfunded, and there are no changes in the plan that might aﬀect obliga-
tions to retirees, then the annual accrual puts a limit on the potential in-
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13. These data are from Schedule B of the Form 5500. Each DB plan is asked for the “ex-
pected increase in current liability due to beneﬁts accruing in the plan year.” About 25 per-
cent of all DB plans did not ﬁle or have missing data for Schedule B. The tabulations reported
here are based on completed responses.46 James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise
Table 1.2 Change in DB Plan Annual Accrued Liability per Active Employee, and
401(k) Plan Contribution per Participant
DB Change in 401(k) Ratio
Accrued Liability Contribution 401(k) to
Year per Active Employee per Participant DB Saving
1990 961 2,507 2.61
1991 976 2,694 2.76
1992 1,110 2,872 2.59
1993 1,252 2,996 2.39
1994 1,315 3,010 2.29
1995 1,359 3,115 2.29
1996 — 3,371 —
1997 1,784 3,065 1.72
Source: DB data are authors’ calculations from Form 5500 data.
Note: To eliminate apparent data entry errors, plans with change in accrued liability greater
than $10,000 per employee have been deleted. Essentially the same results are obtained if
plans with a change greater than $20,000 per employee are eliminated.
crease in plan assets. Plan contributions would ﬂuctuate depending on the
accrual and on the market return on assets held in DB plans. In contrast,
there are no limits on the accumulation of assets in DC plans, although
there are limits on contributions. During periods of favorable asset returns,
such as the 1990s, assets of DC plans are likely to rise much more rapidly
than assets in DB plans.
1.4 Household-Level Data on Retirement Plan Asset Substitution
We now turn to direct analysis of substitution between deﬁned contribu-
tion pension assets and DB pension assets, using household data. One of the
implicit assumptions in many discussions of potential substitution between
DB and DC plan assets is that workers have one pension arrangement or the
other. Yet in many cases, workers have bothplans; we call this dual coverage.
Understanding dual coverage is essential for analyzing the potential for dis-
placement of DB assets by 401(k) assets. We therefore begin our analysis of
substitution by analyzing dual coverage, as well as other aspects of pension
coverage, using the U.S. Department of Labor’s Form 5500 ﬁlings.
After discussion of new ﬁndings based on the Form 5500 data, we con-
sider the potential substitution between 401(k) assets and DB plan assets.
There are several ways substitution may occur, including direct replace-
ment of existing DB plans by 401(k) plans, shrinking or capping DB plans
when 401(k) plans are introduced to ﬁrms with existing DB plans, and per-
haps decisions not to introduce DB plans at ﬁrms that choose to introduce
401(k) plans instead. Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994), Papke (1999), En-
gelhardt (2000), and Pence (2001) discuss the diﬀerent channels of substi-
tution. We consider several ways to evaluate the possible displacement of
DB plan assets by DC assets, and 401(k) assets in particular.In considering possible displacement of plan assets, it is useful to note
the trend in the number of plan participants. Figure 1.18 shows the pro-
portion of wage and salary workers who are pension plan participants, in-
cluding persons counted in more than one plan. The total increased from 64
to 81 percent between 1975 and 1997. Note that in 1985 and 1986, about
20 percent of the labor force participated in the IRA program. This pro-
portion fell to about 4 percent by the mid-1990s.
1.4.1 Dual Coverage and 401(k) Plans
Information on employer-provided pension plans, including 401(k)
plans, is reported each year in ﬁrm Form 5500 ﬁlings, which provide data
on funding and other ﬁnancial features of pension plans. We have used
these data as the basis for a number of calculations. The top panel of table
1.3 shows the fraction of 401(k) participants that also have a DB plan for
the years 1984 to 1997. Three columns of data are presented. The ﬁrst col-
umn pertains to all 401(k) plans. For the years 1988 to 1997, the second
and third columns present results for preexisting 401(k) plans and new
401(k) plans in each year. The proportion of 401(k) participants with a
DB plan declined substantially over the period—from 82.4 percent to
42.4 percent. The proportion of DB participants in new 401(k) plans was
substantially smaller than the proportion in existing plans in all years. On
average, the proportion in new plans was about 26 percent. There is no-
table year-to-year ﬂuctuation, which we suspect is due to small sample
sizes.
The second panel of table 1.3 shows the 401(k) participation rate, given
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Fig. 1.18 Ratio of plan participants to private wage and salary employment, with
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Table 1.3 401(k) Plans: Percentage with DB Plan and Participation Rate
All 401(k) Pre-existing Plans in First Year
Year Plans Plans of Coverage





1988 67.8 69.3 47.5
1989 65.3 66.8 46.0
1990 61.8 63.5 32.8
1991 58.2 60.2 26.1
1992 55.7 58.3 19.0
1993 52.9 54.4 22.9
1994 51.0 51.6 32.9
1995 46.9 47.6 28.0
1996 45.8 46.0 39.4
1997 42.4 43.2 22.5
401(k) Participation Rate Given Eligibility (Percent)
1990 83.4 83.7 77.3
1991 81.5 82.2 70.4
1992 81.4 82.0 72.8
1993 80.0 80.6 68.7
1994 79.9 80.4 63.0
1995 77.5 78.3 54.4
1996 77.0 77.1 63.6
1997 75.8 76.0 71.4
Percent of All Plans (Participants)
1988 100.0 86.3 (93.0) 13.7 (7.0)
1989 100.0 85.9 (92.7) 14.1 (7.3)
1990 100.0 87.7 (94.5) 12.3 (5.5)
1991 100.0 89.8 (94.1) 10.2 (5.9)
1992 100.0 89.6 (93.4) 10.4 (6.6)
1993 100.0 89.3 (95.2) 10.7 (4.8)
1994 100.0 94.6 (97.0) 5.4 (3.0)
1995 100.0 95.2 (96.7) 4.8 (3.3)
1996 100.0 95.9 (97.4) 4.1 (2.6)
1997 100.0 95.7 (96.4) 4.3 (3.7)
Source: Authors’ calculations from Form 5500 ﬁlings.
eligibility, for the years 1990 to 1997.14 These rates are in excess of 75 per-
cent in all years. For preexisting plans, the rate is around 80 percent, de-
clining from about 83 to 76 percent between 1990 and 1997. The partici-
pation rate for new plans is about 65 percent on average, with no clear
14. These data are not available prior to 1990. The participation rate is the ratio of partici-
pants with positive account balances to total participants. All other panels in this table are
based on data for active (nonretired) participants.trend over time. Although not shown in the table, in 1988, 86.3 percent of
all plans were preexisting, and 93 percent of all participants were in preex-
isting plans. These proportions changed over time so that by 1997, 95.7
percent of all plans were preexisting and 96.4 percent of participants were
in these plans. Very little of the decline in DB dual coverage is accounted
for by 401(k) participants with dual coverage who subsequently lost their
DB plan.
Table 1.4 shows 401(k) contribution and participation rates by dual DB
coverage status. The average contribution per participant increased sub-
stantially over time, as shown previously. The information in table 1.4
shows that the average contribution is 25 to 40 percent higher for those
with than for those without a DB plan. Perhaps ﬁrms with DB plans pay
higher salaries than ﬁrms without DB plans. This may make both employer
and employee 401(k) contributions higher in ﬁrms oﬀering DB plans. It is
also possible, as Katona (1965) suggested, that participation in one pen-
sion plan increases workers’ awareness of saving-related issues and thereby
encourages other saving. Participation rates in 401(k) plans are somewhat
higher for persons who have a DB plan than for those who do not. Persons
with a DB plan may also be older, and PVW (1998a) show that 401(k) par-
ticipation rates tend to increase with age.
1.4.2 Loss of Dual Coverage
The data underlying table 1.3, in particular the proportion of new- and
continuing-plan 401(k) participants with a DB plan, are shown in the ﬁrst
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Table 1.4 401(k) Contribution and Participation Rate, by DB Coverage
Year All 401(k) Plans With a DB Plan Without a DB Plan
Contributions per Active Participant
1990 2,394 2,586 2,082
1991 2,433 2,700 2,061
1992 2,594 2,916 2,188
1993 2,718 3,075 2,310
1994 2,744 3,154 2,315
1995 2,896 3,417 2,435
1996 3,001 3,429 2,638
1997 3,056 3,615 2,645
Participation Rate Given Eligible
1990 83.4 83.4 83.3
1991 81.5 83.3 79.0
1992 81.4 83.9 78.2
1993 80.0 82.4 77.3
1994 79.9 82.3 77.3
1995 77.5 80.4 74.9
1996 77.0 80.5 74.1
1997 75.8 78.4 74.0
Source: Authors’ calculations from Form 5500 ﬁlings.panel of table 1B.1. From these data, it is possible to determine the rate at
which 401(k) participants with dual coverage lose DB coverage. We ﬁnd
that the loss rate is 1.0 percent for 1996–97, 4.6 percent (1995–96), 1.7 per-
cent (1994–95), 0.7 percent (1993–94), –1.1 percent (1992–93), 6.1 percent
(1991–92), and –5.1 percent (1990–91). A negative sign indicates that the
number of 401(k) participants with DB plans increased from one year to
the next. On average the year to year loss rate was 1.1 percent.
These data show that very few persons with dual coverage lost their DB
coverage over this time period. The data also show that the decline in the
number of persons covered by DB plans over this period cannot be ac-
counted for by the loss of the DB plans of 401(k) participants; we have no
reason to believe that the experience in earlier years was any diﬀerent.
These data suggest that the decline in the proportion of 401(k) participants
with DB plans is largely accounted for by the entry of new 401(k) partici-
pants with low dual coverage rates. This is consistent with diﬀusion of
401(k) plans to smaller ﬁrms without prior DB plans.
1.4.3 Hypothetical Growth of Deﬁned Beneﬁt Assets 
Without 401(k) Plans
We now consider two simple scenarios of how DB assets might have
evolved in the absence of 401(k) plans. The scenarios make extreme as-
sumptions concerning the replacement of DB plans by 401(k) plans. The
results can be interpreted as providing bounds on the extent of substitution
between 401(k) plans and DB plans. The simulations are based on three
data series for the period 1984 to 1997: (1) the number of participants in
401(k) plans and DB plans, (2) contributions per participant to 401(k)
plans and to DB plans, and (3) the percent of 401(k) plan participants that
also have a DB plan. We obtain the sum of plan contributions—both to
401(k) plans and to DB plans—by persons with a 401(k) plan. We then
compare this sum to contributions that would have been made to DB plans
in the absence of the 401(k) program. Table 1.5 shows the data and calcu-
lated values.
The number of DB and 401(k) plan participants is shown in columns (2)
and (3) of table 1.5. The percent of 401(k) enrollees also enrolled in a DB
plan is shown in column (4). The average contribution per participant in
these plans is shown in columns (5) to (8). For persons with both a DB and
a 401(k), total pension saving is necessarily greater than saving under a
stand-alone DB plan.15 In 1984, about 82 percent of 401(k) participants
also had a DB plan. The percent of workers with dual enrollment declined
rather consistently to about 42 percent in 1997. In the ﬁrst years after they
50 James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise
15. DB plans generally preceded supplemental 401(k) plans. Because DB plans are formula
based, it is diﬃcult to scale back DB beneﬁts when 401(k)s are introduced. Indeed, the data
in table 1.5 show that DB contributions are higher in ﬁrms where DB plans are supplemented





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.became available, most 401(k) plans were initiated in large ﬁrms with an
already existing DB plan. Subsequently, the diﬀusion of 401(k) plans in-
cluded larger numbers of smaller ﬁrms that were less likely to have preex-
isting DB plans. To the extent that the expansion in 401(k) plans has been
increasing through plans in smaller ﬁrms without prior DB plans, 401(k)
contributions are not substituting for contributions to preexisting DB
plans. Whether such ﬁrms would have adopted another plan if it were not
for the 401(k) option is an open question; we address this in the following
alternative scenarios.
On average, per enrollee contributions to 401(k) plans are greater than
per participant contributions to DB plans. In addition, the average DB
contribution is greater for those who also have a 401(k) plan, and the
401(k) contribution is greater for those who also have a DB plan.
Contributions to the plans of employees with a 401(k) are shown in col-
umns (9) to (12). We separately report DB contributions in ﬁrms with and
without 401(k) plans, as well as contributions to 401(k) plans in ﬁrms with
and without DB plans. The nominal sum of pension contributions on be-
half of employees covered by a 401(k) plan over the years 1984–97 is $1,061
billion. About $252 billion was contributed to the DB plans of 401(k) en-
rollees with dual coverage, about $499 billion to the plans of those with
dual coverage, and about $309 billion to the plans of those enrolled only in
a 401(k) plan.
How much higher might DB plan contributions have been in the absence
of 401(k) plans? We consider two alternative scenarios that put an upper
bound on the displacement of DB contributions by 401(k) contributions.
First, we assume that all persons who have stand-alone 401(k) plans would
otherwise have had stand-alone DB plans in the absence of the 401(k) pro-
gram. (We also assume that DB contributions for persons with both 401(k)
plans and DB plans are unchanged.) As a practical matter it is unlikely that
most ﬁrms that now oﬀer only 401(k)s—especially small ﬁrms—would
ever oﬀer DB plans in the absence of 401(k) plans, so this assumption
should produce an upper bound on the amount of substitution.
Under this scenario, contributions to all DB plans would have totaled
about $466 billion from 1984 to 1997. This is shown in column (13), which
is the product of columns (3) and (7). This $466 billion is composed of $252
billion of actual contributions to DB plans by persons with dual coverage
and $214 billion in additional DB contributions that would result if all
stand-alone 401(k) plans were converted to DB plans, and if these con-
verted plans then exhibited the average contribution rate for stand-alone
DB plans. This additional $214 billion of DB contributions represents only
26 percent of the $1,061 billion of the total contributions to the plans of
401(k) participants.
The low estimate is the consequence of two factors. First, stand-alone
401(k) plans are a relatively recent phenomenon. Much of the growth of
The Transition to Personal Accounts and Increasing Retirement Wealth 53401(k) participation, particularly in the early years, is among persons who
retained DB coverage. For these persons there is little or no displacement.
Second, average contribution rates to DB plans are substantially lower
than contribution rates to 401(k) plans. Replacing a stand-alone DB plan
by a stand-alone 401(k) plan will, on average, increase contributions per
participant.
A less extreme scenario, but one that is still likely to overstate substitu-
tion, is that the entire reduction in DB plan participation between 1984 and
1997 can be attributed to displacement caused by the introduction of the
401(k) program. The number of DB participants displaced in each year un-
der this scenario is shown in column (14). “Lost” contributions to DB
plans under this scenario are shown in column (15), and they total about
$86 billion. This is only 11 percent of all 401(k) contributions.
The absence of large-scale displacement is the consequence of several
factors. First, much of the growth of 401(k) plans, particularly in the early
years, is among persons who retain their DB coverage. Second, 401(k) con-
tributions as a share of salary are about twice as great as DB plan contri-
butions as a share of salary, so even in the most extreme case, 401(k) assets
could not have been fully oﬀset by a reduction in what otherwise would
have been the DB assets of the 401(k) enrollees. Indeed, the earlier discus-
sion suggests that accumulation of retirement assets resulting from 401(k)
contributions is likely to be substantially greater than the accumulation
from contributions to DB plans. Finally, the decline in the number of per-
sons covered by DB plans but not by 401(k) plans is too small to account
for much of the 401(k) growth.
1.4.4 Projections of 401(k) Assets
The foregoing calculations compare aggregate 401(k) plan assets with
aggregate DB plan assets in two hypothetical scenarios. We can also make
comparisons between 401(k) plan assets and DB plan assets using house-
hold-level data. Data from the HRS suggest that in 1992, the mean value
of assets in DB plans was $54,800 for persons aged 51 to 61. The average
for employees of all ages would be much less. In PVW (1998a), we esti-
mated how much the 1992 HRS respondents would have accumulated in
their 401(k) accounts if they had been eligible for 401(k) plans over their
entire working lives. Based on our projections of the participation rates of
future cohorts, we made forward-looking projections, one for the cohort
reaching age sixty-ﬁve in 2025, and the other for those reaching age sixty-
ﬁve in 2035. We compared our projected 401(k) assets to Social Security as-
sets, assuming that the Social Security program remained unchanged.
We  can also compare projected 401(k) assets to DB pension assets.
While Social Security assets of HRS respondents averaged $103,392, DB
pension assets average only $54,500. PVW (2001) suggest that projected
401(k) assets would be 136 to 451 percent of DB pension plan assets (de-
54 James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wisepending on how contributions are invested), assuming no reduction in DB
assets. Even if DB pension assets were set to zero for this cohort, which is
tantamount to assuming that 401(k) plans crowded out all DB plans, there
would still be substantial incremental 401(k) wealth. Data on 401(k) par-
ticipation rates and contributions that have become available since we
made our projections lead us to believe that, if anything, these 401(k) asset
projections may underestimate future 401(k) assets.
The “cohort approach” used to obtain the projections described above
has the advantage of combining all survey respondents. It is therefore not
contaminated by saver heterogeneity. It is also unaﬀected by diﬀerences in
the lifetime accumulation proﬁles of DB and DC assets, because the com-
parison is between the realized assets of persons at, or approaching, retire-
ment. These comparisons reﬂect the realized assets, after a lifetime of pen-
sion saving, that are available to support retirement consumption.
1.4.5 The “Eligibility Experiment” Applied to 
Deﬁned Beneﬁt Plan Assets
In PVW (1998a), we used data from the SIPP to compare the ﬁnancial
assets and home equity of families eligible for a 401(k) plan with the assets
of families who were not eligible. We found little diﬀerence in the assets of
eligible and noneligible families in 1984—near the introduction of the
401(k) program. By 1991, however, the assets of the eligible group were
substantially greater than those of the ineligible group. We concluded that
there was essentially no substitution of 401(k) assets for other ﬁnancial as-
sets or for home equity. This comparison is the basis for our comparison of
the pension assets of HRS respondents.
Following the same idea, we considered whether the apparent increase
in the ﬁnancial assets of the 401(k) eligible groups could have been oﬀset
by a reduction in their DB assets. For this to have happened, the DB cov-
erage of persons who became eligible for a 401(k) plan would have had to
decline. The results, however, are diﬃcult to interpret. We now explain why
and oﬀer our interpretation of the data patterns.
In 1984, there was little diﬀerence in the non-IRA-401(k) ﬁnancial assets
or the home equity assets of the eligible and ineligible groups. But, the eli-
gible group was much more likely to have a DB plan, especially at the lower
income levels, than it was in later years. By 1991, there was still little diﬀer-
ence in the non-IRA-401(k) ﬁnancial assets or the home equity assets of
the two groups. But the net total ﬁnancial assets of the eligible group were
much greater than the ﬁnancial assets of the ineligible group. There is no
measure of DB plan assets for either year in the SIPP. Could the DB plan
assets of the eligible group, relative to those of the ineligible group, have
fallen enough to oﬀset the increase in ﬁnancial assets of the eligibles? To
judge the likelihood of this, we considered the change in the DB coverage
of the two groups.
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DB coverage of eligible and ineligible families. The percent decline in DB
coverage was much greater for the ineligible group than for the eligible
group. One might judge from this fact that there was not a disproportion-
ate fall in the DB assets of the eligible group. But interpretation of the data
is confounded by two trends. One is the general decline over time in the pro-
portion of employees covered by a DB plan, which would aﬀect both the
eligible and the ineligible groups. The other trend is the increase in 401(k)
eligibility. As 401(k) eligibility increases, families who were ineligible be-
come eligible. The eﬀect of this movement from ineligible to eligible status
on the percent of eligibles covered by a DB plan depends on the premove
DB coverage of the new 401(k) eligibles.
Suppose we rely on Ippolito and Thompson’s (2000) result that existing
DB plans are very rarely terminated when 401(k) plans are started, and we
accept our previous result that once dual DB-401(k) coverage is estab-
lished, subsequent loss in DB coverage is very unlikely. The HRS data
alone do not enable us to disentangle the various determinants of DB cov-
erage. But our attempts to match the shift in the DB coverage of the 401(k)
eligible and ineligible groups suggest that during this period, most of those
who moved from ineligible to eligible status had a DB plan before becom-
ing eligible—reducing the proportion of the ineligible group with a DB
plan and increasing the proportion of the eligible group with a DB plan.
1.4.6 Cohort Analysis of Deﬁned Beneﬁt versus 401(k) Substitution
We emphasized before that if the increase in 401(k) assets is to be oﬀset
by a reduction in DB assets, the reductions must come for the most part
through a reduction in DB participation. We showed that the reduction
over time in the DB coverage of 401(k) participants with dual 401(k) and
DB coverage was very small, and concluded that shifting composition of
the 401(k) eligible pool was the most likely explanation for changing DB
participation rates of eligibles and ineligibles. Another way to evaluate the
extent of the reduction in DB participation with the increase in 401(k)
plans is to consider cohort data. Figure 1.19 shows the relationship be-
tween 401(k) eligibility and participation in DB plans for three cohorts,
using data from the SIPP for 1984, 1987, 1991, 1993, and 1995. These data
span the ﬁrst thirteen years of the 401(k) program. Each cohort is identi-
ﬁed by its age in 1984. For example, the C(44) cohort is followed from ages
forty-four to ﬁfty-ﬁve.
Within each cohort, there were enormous increases in 401(k) eligibility.
But the within-cohort increases in 401(k) eligibility are not nearly oﬀset by
corresponding within-cohort reductions in DB participation. Indeed, for
the two younger cohorts, both DB participation and 401(k) eligibility in-
crease with age. There is no evidence of DB-for-401(k) oﬀset, with rising
401(k) participation associated with declining DB plan coverage. These
data pertain to all employed persons, and are not confounded by the “mix-
56 James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wiseture” problem that makes the results of the eligibility experiment diﬃcult
to evaluate.
The evidence in ﬁgure 1.19 does not necessarily imply that 401(k) plans
did not displace any DB plans. Perhaps DB participation would have risen
more rapidly were it not for the spread of 401(k) plans, or ﬁrms would have
oﬀered more generous deﬁned beneﬁt plans if 401(k) plans had not ex-
panded. But it seems to us extremely unlikely that DB plan participation
would have increased, other things being equal, as quickly as 401(k) plans
spread. For example, for a cohort like the C(44) group, it is likely that DB
participation would have changed little with age, as ﬁgure 1.19 shows, even
if 401(k) participation had not increased.
In addition, the 401(k) data show very large cohort eﬀects. At any age,
successively younger cohorts are much more likely to be eligible for a
401(k) plan. There are also DB cohort eﬀects, with successively younger
cohorts less likely, on average, to be covered by a DB plan. The data for the
few cohorts shown in ﬁgure 1.19, however, do not reveal this trend. (The
cohort data are only shown through age ﬁfty-ﬁve. The SIPP data do not al-
low correction for the more rapid retirement of persons covered by DB
plans after the plan early retirement age, which is often at age ﬁfty-ﬁve.
Thus at older ages it is not possible to use these data to make accurate com-
parisons of 401(k) and DB plan participation rates.)
1.5 Retirement Plan Substitution among Older Workers: HRS Evidence
The HRS provides the most comprehensive information available on
persons approaching retirement. The heads of households for HRS fami-
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Fig. 1.19 DB participation and 401(k) eligibility: Data for three cohortslies were ages ﬁfty-one to sixty-one in 1992. Some of these persons could
have participated in a 401(k) plan for up to ten years by 1992. In principle
the HRS data should allow estimation of the contribution of the 401(k)
program to the saving of persons in this age group during the early years of
the program. Such estimates might be obtained through a comparison of
401(k) eligibles and ineligibles, as described in the previous section and in
PVW (1995). Unfortunately, because the HRS asks respondents whether
they contributeto a 401(k) plan, not whether they are eligibleto contribute,
it is not possible to directly estimate the 401(k) eligibility eﬀect.
In this section, we explain the problems of inferring 401(k) eligibility sta-
tus in the HRS. We then discuss estimates of 401(k) eligibility based on ad-
justments that at least partially address these problems. Finally, we use
these estimates to analyze the relationship between 401(k) eligibility and
pension plan assets. Consistent with the results reported previously, we
ﬁnd no evidence that the increase in 401(k) assets was oﬀset by a reduction
in DB assets. We believe, however, that comprehensive determination of
401(k) eligibility status in the HRS is not possible and that our HRS results
are likely to underestimate the net gain in pension retirement assets from
the 401(k) program.
The relationship between 401(k) plans and DB retirement assets in the
1992 HRS is also the focus of a recent study by Engelhardt (2000). He con-
cludes that DB assets are higher among households ineligible for a 401(k)
than among those eligible for a 401(k), suggesting substitution of 401(k)
for DB pension assets. The ﬁndings presented previously suggest that em-
ployees covered by 401(k) programs should have more retirement assets
than employees not covered by a 401(k) plan. We ﬁnd that a key reason for
the diﬀerence between Engelhardt’s conclusions and ours is the assign-
ment of eligibility status, which is critical to determining pension wealth.
1.5.1 Data Limitations in the HRS
Our aim is to provide estimates of the pension and other assets of HRS
respondents who were and were not eligible for a 401(k) plan. To begin, we
compare DB coverage rates, for persons eligible and ineligible for a 401(k)
plan, in the HRS and in other surveys. The other surveys explicitly inquire
about 401(k) eligibility, whereas the HRS does not. This comparison is pre-
sented in table 1.6and pertains to pension status on the employees’ current
job.16 The HRS rates are based on the assignment of eligibility used by En-
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16. The HRS provides some information on pension status on prior jobs as well. We restrict
attention to the current job since it is diﬃcult to determine 401(k) eligibility on prior jobs.
Many employees have rolled prior 401(k) balances into IRAs, and thus we are likely to un-
derestimate 401(k) eligibility on prior jobs. The HRS percentages in the table pertain to re-
spondents who indicated that they had a DB or 401(k) plan. We have made no attempt here
to allocate other responses such as “both,” “don’t know,” and “DC-type unknown.” We have
also dropped self-employed persons.gelhardt (2000). All entries in the table are weighted and all entries except
those derived from the Form 5500 data pertain to persons in the age range
covered by the HRS.
The 1992 HRS stands out as the only survey in which DB coverage is
higher among 401(k) ineligibles than among eligibles.17 In the other sur-
veys, the DB coverage rate for eligibles is more than twice as great as the
DB coverage rate for ineligibles. The particular method used to assign eli-
gibility is one reason for the large disparity between the HRS and other
surveys. We also show later that even under alternative, and we believe
more reasonable, conventions for assigning eligibility, there remains a wide
gap between DB coverage rates reported in the HRS and the rates reported
in other surveys.
The HRS does not inquire about eligibility for a 401(k) plan, although it
asks about 401(k) contributions.18 Consider the 1992 HRS data on 401(k)
contributor status and DB coverage, shown in table 1.7. The HRS respon-
dents report whether they contribute to a 401(k) plan and whether they are
covered by a DB plan. These data are shown in the left panel of table 1.8.
They pertain only to persons who indicate they are included in their em-
ployer’s plan. (They diﬀer from the HRS data in table 1.6, which were
weighted and also include additional persons assumed to be eligible for a
401(k).) The unweighted percent of 401(k) contributors with a DB plan is
somewhat greater than the percent of noncontributors with a DB plan—
46 versus 41.7 percent. But compared to the DB coverage of 401(k) eligi-
bles versus noneligibles reported in other surveys (table 1.6), these data for
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Table 1.6 Percent of 401(k) Eligibles and Ineligibles with a DB Pension, by Survey
Survey and Year Eligibles Ineligibles Ratio
1992 HRS 40.8 43.6 0.94
Form 5500 55.7 —
1993 CPS 53.9 25.4 2.12
1991 SIPP 69.5 28.4 2.45
1995 SCF 38.3 17.2 2.23
Source: Authors’ calculations from the surveys listed in the ﬁrst column of the table.
17. Using households rather than persons, Engelhardt (2000) ﬁnds that 51 percent of the
eligibles and 48 percent of the ineligibles have a DB plan. A household is classiﬁed as eligible
if either member is eligible for a 401(k) plan. The data in table 1.6 are also consistent with the
results of Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994) who ﬁnd the ratio of eligibles with DB coverage to
ineligibles with DB coverage in the SIPP to be 1.65 in 1984, 1.77 in 1987, and 2.27 in 1991.
18. These are self-reported pension data. For persons who self-report having a pension, the
HRS collected pension data from the employer. Thus persons who incorrectly self-report no
pension coverage will be missing employer-reported data as well. In addition, the need to
match every respondent to a pension combined with an employer response rate of only 65 per-
cent means that fewer than half of the households have complete employer-reported pen-
sions. Both Engelhardt (2000) and Gustman and Steinmeier (2000b) show an enormous de-
gree of conﬂict between self-reported and ﬁrm-reported pension status.Table 1.7 HRS 1992 Reported 401(k) Contributor Data and Illustrative Inferred
401(k) Eligibility
Reported in the HRS  Inferred from External Sources
401(k) Contributor 401(k) Eligible
DB Coverage Yes No All Yes No All
Number
DB 622 1,699 2,321 919 1,402 2,321
No DB 729 2,376 3,105 729 2,376 3,105
All 1,351 4,075 5,426 1,648 3,778 5,426
Percent
DB 46.0 41.7 42.8 55.8 37.1 42.8
No DB 54.0 58.3 57.2 44.2 62.9 57.2
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Authors’ calculations from the HRS.
Table 1.8 HRS Conditional Median Assets by 401(k) Eligibility Status (with eligibility
determined by our random assignment method)
Income Interval ($)
Asset Category and 20,000– 30,000– 40,000– 50,000–
Eligibility Status  20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 75,000  75,000
Net Non-Retirement Financial Assets
Eligible 3,069 3,862 5,614 8,983 14,672 33,155
Ineligible 2,897 3,069 6,310 6,250 13,966 23,690
Diﬀerence 172 793 –697 2,733 707 9,466∗∗
Retirement Assets Other Than 401(k)
Eligible 18,634 24,539 40,746 46,996 83,533 180,000
Ineligible 15,326 22,738 37,827 50,338 73,270 146,859
Diﬀerence 3,308 1,801 2,919 –3,342 10,263∗∗ 33,141∗∗
Total Retirement Assets
Eligible 20,701 34,170 50,492 60,263 101,524 240,902
Ineligible 14,580 22,909 37,862 50,748 73,814 145,626
Diﬀerence 6,120 11,261∗∗ 12,631∗∗ 9,515 27,709∗∗ 95,276∗∗
Net Housing Equity
Eligible 35,135 37,248 45,641 42,496 59,043 83,409
Ineligible 21,596 32,854 45,233 48,861 55,350 79,517
Diﬀerence 13,539∗∗ 4,393 409 –6,365 3,693 3,891
DB Coverage
Eligible 0.29 0.42 0.5 0.53 0.66 0.74
Ineligible 0.2 0.35 0.53 0.54 0.63 0.61
Source: Authors’ calculations from the HRS.
∗∗Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.contributors versus noncontributors show a very low rate of DB coverage.
Given that the HRS does not provide eligibility, we want to convert 401(k)
contributor status data to 401(k) eligibility status data. In particular, to
make the conversion we must identify persons among the 401(k) noncon-
tributors who are eligible to contribute to a 401(k) plan.
There are two separate determinations to be made. The empirically more
important case involves noncontributing 401(k) eligibles who are covered
by another pension. These persons would be among the 1,699 persons in
table 1.7 who do not contribute to a 401(k) plan, but have a DB plan. The
sequence of questions in the ﬁrst three waves of the HRS provides no way
for a noncontributing 401(k) eligible, also covered by a DB plan, to self-
identify as eligible for a 401(k) plan; such information will be available in
the 2000 wave of the HRS. Since a large portion of 401(k) eligibles are cov-
ered by a DB plan, it is likely that a large fraction of the noncontributors
with a DB plan are in fact eligible for a 401(k) plan. Engelhardt (2000) as-
sumes that all of these are ineligibles without a DB plan, thus likely mis-
classifying a large fraction of persons with a DB plan.
Here, we simply want to illustrate what the unknown eligibility numbers
could be. Suppose we convert the contributor data to eligibility data as fol-
lows. We know from the Form 5500 data that about 82 percent of eligibles
contributed to their 401(k) plan in 1992. Thus there would be 1,351/.82  
1,648 persons eligible for a 401(k) – 297 more than contributed to a 401(k).
Using an extreme example, suppose that all of the 297 had a DB plan but
did not contribute. Then there would be 919   622   297 eligibles with a
DB plan, and 1,402 ineligibles with a DB plan. This estimate is shown in
the right panel of table 1.7. The key point is that even with this assumption,
only 55.8 percent of the eligible group would have a DB plan compared to
37.1 percent for the ineligible group, a ratio of 1.5. This ratio is still much
lower than the ratios from any of the other surveys. Thus it would appear
that if the data reported in the HRS are used to determine eligibility, the
implied proportions of 401(k) eligibles and ineligibles with a DB plan are
far from the values in other surveys that explicitly inquire about eligibility.
There is in fact an additional problem in the HRS data, and a second de-
termination to be made, which is not addressed in the table 1.7 illustration.
Respondents are asked whether they are “included” in a pension plan. Re-
spondents who say no (and presumably do not have a DB plan), are asked
whether they are eligible for a pension plan oﬀered by their employer.
About 175 respondents say yes. But we don’t know what kind of pension is
oﬀered. In particular, is it a DB, 401(k), or a non-401(k) DC, or some other
plan? Engelhardt (2000) assumes that all of these persons are 401(k) eligi-
bles without a DB plan.19 Thus this assumption adds respondents with no
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19. Evidence from other surveys suggests that not all of these persons are eligible for a
401(k) plan. The 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) asked a similar question but fol-DB coverage to the pool of 401(k) eligibles. Recall that the ﬁrst—and more
serious—misclassiﬁcation adds eligibles with DB coverage to the pool of
401(k) ineligibles. These two misclassiﬁcations bias upward the DB assets
of 401(k) ineligibles, and bias downward the DB assets of 401(k) eligibles.
The combined eﬀect of these two forms of misclassiﬁcation may be sub-
stantial.
1.5.2 HRS Results Based on Eligibility
There is no easy way to determine with certainty the 401(k) eligibility
status of HRS respondents. The convention used by Engelhardt (2000), as
explained previously, biases downward the proportion of 401(k) eligibles
with a DB plan and biases upward the proportion of 401(k) ineligibles with
a DB plan. We adopt assumptions that we believe are more neutral with re-
spect to DB coverage by 401(k) eligibility status.
We  need to determine the eligibility of each 401(k) respondent. All
401(k) contributors are clearly eligible. Among 401(k) noncontributors,
some are eligible and some are not. Our approach is to determine the pro-
portion of 401(k) noncontributors that is actually eligible to contribute to
a 401(k) plan. We do this based on proportions of noncontributing eligi-
bles that have a DB, as is evident in the Form 5500 data. In 1992, 82 per-
cent of 401(k) eligibles in the Form 5500 data were 401(k) contributors. Let
EE be the total number of eligibles, EC be the number of observed contrib-
utors (all eligible), and ENbe the number of noncontributors that should be
eligible. Then the number of eligibles is EE EC EN. From the Form 5500
data, the ratio of contributors to eligibles is EC/EE   0.82. The number of
additional eligibles among the HRS noncontributors is then EN EC(1/.82
– 1). Thus, the proportion of noncontributors that should be eligible is P 
(1/0.82 – 1)(EC/NN), where NN is the total number of noncontributors.
These calculations suggest that the percentage of noncontributors pre-
dicted to be eligible to contribute to a 401(k) plan in the HRS is equal to P
percent of all observed noncontributors. Of this P percent, the Form 5500
data indicate that 55.7 percent have a DB plan on their current job, and
44.3 percent do not. Thus we randomly reassign .557  Ppercent of 401(k)
noncontributors with a DB plan in the HRS to be noncontributing eli-
gibles. We also randomly reassign .443   P percent of 401(k) noncontrib-
utors without a DB plan to be noncontributing eligibles. This approach as-
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lowed it up by asking what type of plan the respondent was eligible to be included in. Eighty
percent of the weighted responses from persons aged ﬁfty-one to sixty-one indicated a 401(k)
plan for their ﬁrst job, and 36 percent for their second job (62.2 percent overall). The 1993
Current Population Survey (CPS) asks for the reason why a respondent is eligible, but not in-
cluded. Only one-quarter of the respondents indicated that they chose not to contribute,
which would suggest nonparticipation in a 401(k) plan. Instead, part-time status and lack of
tenure with the employer were the most frequently cited reasons for exclusion from an em-
ployer’s pension plan. These other surveys suggest that some of cases assumed to be 401(k) el-
igibles in the HRS are instead persons not covered by their employer’s DB plan.sures that the DB coverage rate of the respondents added to the eligibility
pool is the same as the DB coverage rate of the respondents already in the
pool.
Unfortunately, the Form 5500 benchmark data is not available by age or
by income. The 55.7 percent dual coverage rate that we use is undoubtedly
a low estimate for the HRS respondents (aged ﬁfty-one to sixty-one in
1992) because it applies to all ages, and we know from the previous cohort
data that older persons are more likely to have a DB plan. The other sur-
veys also show that the percent with a DB plan increases with age.
We have adopted a similar assignment convention for missing and am-
biguous responses to pension questions in the HRS. If a respondent is “in-
cluded” in a pension, then the respondent is asked for the plan type—DB
or DC. The respondent is asked to indicate the type of pension for up to
three pensions. The available choices include: “DB,” “DC,” or “both.” A
signiﬁcant number of respondents did not provide a response. We use the
following conventions. First, respondents answering “DB” were coded as
having a DB plan. Second, respondents answering “DC” were then asked
about the type of DC plan. The choices “thrift or saving” or “401K/403B/
SRA” or any combination involving these two choices were coded as 401(k)
plans. The other choices oﬀered pertain to non-401(k)-DC plans. For re-
spondents indicating that they have a DC plan, but not providing the type
of DC plan, we randomly assign the plan as 401(k) or not 401(k) in pro-
portion to the number of valid responses indicating that they had 401(k)
and non-401(k)-DC plans. Third, persons indicating “both” as the type of
pension were coded as having a DB plan anda DC plan. For these respon-
dents the DC plan is randomly assigned to be a 401(k) plan based on the
ratio of 401(k) plans to all DC plans among completed responses. Fourth,
a signiﬁcant number of respondents who indicated they were included in a
pension plan did not provide the type. These persons were randomly as-
signed as having a DB plan or a 401(k) plan in the same proportions as
completed responses.
All of the previous calculations are done at the level of the respondent.
After these assignments are made, we combine the individual data to ob-
tain assignments on a family basis. The asset data is reported on a family
basis. A family is a 401(k) contributor, or 401(k) eligible, if either partner
is a contributor or is eligible.
Table 1.8 presents results comparing the assets of persons eligible and
ineligible for a 401(k) plan.20 The key results are in the panel labeled “total
retirement assets.” Total retirement assets are substantially higher (and the
diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant for all but the lowest income interval)
The Transition to Personal Accounts and Increasing Retirement Wealth 63
20. These are the results of weighted median regressions for 4,895 households. Each house-
hold had to have at least one member working and not self-employed. Covariates include
marital status and the age and education of the head of household. Conditional median asset
balances are evaluated at the sample means of the covariates.for the 401(k) eligible group. The panel just above shows that retirement as-
sets other than 401(k) assets do not diﬀer much by eligibility status, except
for the two highest income intervals. In these top intervals, the assets of el-
igibles are higher than the assets of ineligibles. Thus these estimates suggest
that the accumulation of 401(k) assets was not oﬀset by a reduction in the
DB assets of the HRS respondents. Nonretirement ﬁnancial assets do not
diﬀer much by eligibility status. Some of the cells show zeros because fewer
than half of the observations have nonzero values, and thus the median is
zero.
As previously explained, the HRS data—even after our assignment as-
sumptions—are likely to exaggerate the proportion of 401(k) ineligibles
with a DB plan, relative to the proportion of eligibles with a DB plan. Af-
ter assignment of eligibility, the proportion of 401(k)-eligible households
with DB plans is 59.3 percent and the proportion of ineligibles is 47 per-
cent. The ratio is 1.26, which is still much lower than the ratio reported in
other surveys. The coverage percent by income interval is reported in the
bottom panel of table 1.8. The SIPP-based ratios reported in table 1.6 ex-
ceed 2, when averaged over all income groups. Thus we believe that the cal-
culations in table 1.8 underestimate the addition to pension wealth of fam-
ilies eligible for a 401(k) plan.
1.6 Conclusions
The way Americans save for retirement has changed dramatically in the
last two decades. In 1980, 92 percent of private retirement saving contri-
butions were to employer-based plans and 64 percent of these contribu-
tions, or 59 percent of all contributions, were to DB plans. In 1999, about
85 percent of private contributions went to accounts directed largely by in-
dividuals. In this paper we have analyzed a broad range of aggregate and
household data to understand the implications of this change.
The aggregate data show that assets in retirement plans have increased
ﬁvefold, relative to wage and salary earnings, over the past two decades.
The increase in these assets to support retirement will likely mean very
large increases in the assets of future retirees. The increase in DC assets has
been so large that it is unlikely that a signiﬁcant fraction of the growth in
DC assets occurred at the expense of reduced DB assets.
In addition, over the past two decades, the annual retirement plan con-
tribution rate has been over 5 percent, as a proportion of NIPA personal
income, and over 8 percent relative to NIPA wage and salary earnings.
Both are much higher than the NIPA personal saving rate, which is now
close to zero. The treatment of retirement plan contributions and payouts
in the NIPAs contributes to the very low measured personal saving rate.
Retirement saving today would likely be substantially greater if Con-
gress had not enacted legislation in the late 1980s to limit ﬁrm contribu-
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vorable asset market returns during the 1990s that reduced the need for em-
ployers to contribute to their DB plans, the retirement plan contribution
rate would have been at least 1 percentage point higher in the late 1990s
than it actually was. It is also likely that the retirement plan contribution
rate would be much higher today if it were not for the retrenchment of the
IRA program after 1986.
On average, the contribution per active participant to 401(k) plans has
been about twice as large as contributions to DB plans, suggesting much
higher wealth accumulation under 401(k) than under DB plans. In addi-
tion, diﬀerences in the pattern of saving by age can have an important
eﬀect on retirement asset accumulation under the two plans. From the em-
ployee perspective, retirement saving through a DB or DC plan each year
can be thought of as the increase in the ﬁnancial support that each plan will
provide in retirement. Employee retirement saving under a DC plan is
quite transparent to the employee, while annual employee saving under a
DB plan is quite opaque and unlikely to be clearly understood. The pattern
of saving by age is much diﬀerent under DB and 401(k) plans, as we show
using a hypothetical DB plan. The pattern of pension wealth accrual in the
DB plan typically provides a large incentive to retire early. As a conse-
quence, DB employees will typically accumulate assets over fewer years
than DC employees. Taken together, the higher contribution rate under
DC plans and the greater number of years over which assets accumulate are
likely to increase very substantially the asset accumulation in DC plans
relative to DB plans.
Our analysis of household-level data on retirement saving yields a num-
ber of ﬁndings that complement the conclusions from the aggregate anal-
ysis. Dual coverage under both 401(k) and DB plans is common, but it has
declined over time as more employees without a prior DB plan have been
oﬀered 401(k)s. Over 80 percent of 401(k) eligibles had a DB plan in 1984,
and about 43 percent had one in 1997. Few 401(k) participants covered by
a DB plan—only about 1 percent each year—subsequently lose DB cov-
erage. Our estimates suggest that between 1984 and 1997, total contribu-
tions to all pension plans of persons with a 401(k) plan were three times as
great as what contributions to DB plans would have been in the absence of
the 401(k) program. The displacement of DB plan contributions was prob-
ably less than 11 percent of the total plan contributions of 401(k) partici-
pants.
Based on our prior independent projections, the mean 401(k) balances
of persons who will reach retirement age in 2035 will be 1.4 to 4.5 times as
great, depending on asset market returns, as mean DB balances, assuming
no decline in DB coverage. Cohort analysis shows a decline in DB cover-
age for successively younger cohorts, but no within-cohort reduction in
DB coverage as 401(k) coverage increased.
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increased the total retirement assets of persons approaching retirement in
1992. We ﬁnd no evidence of substitution of 401(k) assets for DB assets for
persons in the HRS age group.
Appendix A
Data Sources
Figure 1.1: Private retirement assets are the sum of DB, DC pension re-
serves from the Flow of Funds Accounts (FFA), and IRA assets from
Sabelhaus (2000). Total retirement assets also include state, local, and
federal pension reserves from the FFA. Wage and salary disbursements
are from table 2.1 of the NIPA. Pension assets held by life insurance
companies are excluded.
Figure 1.2: The DB and DC assets for 1985–99 are from the FFA. For the
years 1975–84, estimates are obtained by applying the ratio of DB to DC
assets from Form 5500 ﬁlings to total assets from the FFA. The IRA as-
sets are from Sabelhaus (2000). The ﬁgure excludes private pension as-
sets held by life insurance companies.
Figure 1.3: All series are from the FFA.
Figure 1.4: Housing equity is from the FFA. Other assets are total net
worth (from the FFA), less housing equity, less private retirement assets
as deﬁned in note to ﬁgure 1.1. Personal disposable income is from table
2.1 of the NIPA.
Figure 1.5, panel A: The DB and DC contributions are from Form 5500 re-
ports. The data for 1998 and 1999 are authors’ estimates. The IRA and
Keogh contributions are from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Sta-
tistics of Income. The IRA contributions pertain to tax-deductible con-
tributions only.
Figure 1.5, panel B: Private pension contributions are the sum of the com-
ponents described in panel A. State and local and federal contributions
are from the NIPA.
Figure 1.6, panel A: Private pension contributions are the sum of the com-
ponents described in ﬁgure 1.5, panel A. Total pension contributions are
the sum of the components described in ﬁgure 1.5, panel B. Personal dis-
posable income is from the NIPA.
Figure 1.6, panel B: Private pension contributions are the sum of the com-
ponents described in ﬁgure 1.5, panel A. Total pension contributions are
the sum of the components described in ﬁgure 1.5, panel B. Wage and
salary earnings (disbursements) are from the NIPA.
Figure 1.7 and ﬁgure 1.8, panel A: All series except IRA and Keogh par-
ticipants are from the Form 5500. The IRA and Keogh participants are
from (SOI). 401(k) data for 1982 and 1983 are authors’ estimates.
66 James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. WiseFigure 1.8, panel B: The 401(k) series is from the Form 5500. 401(k) data
for 1982 and 1983 are authors’ estimates. The IRA data are from the IRS
Statistics of Income.
Figure 1.8, panel C: The Keogh data are from the IRS Statistics of Income.
Figures 1.9, 1.10, and 1.11: All DB and DC plan data are from the Form
5500, whereas Keogh data are from the IRS Statistics of Income.
Figure 1.12: Actual pension contributions are the same as in Figure 1.6,
panel b. The DB adjusted series is as described in the text. Data to cal-
culate this series are not available after 1996. Wage and salary earnings
(disbursements) are from the NIPA.
Figure 1.13: All data are from the Form 5500.
Figure 1.14: IRA contributions are from the IRS Statistics of Income. The
IRA contributions pertain to tax-deductible contributions only. IRA
beneﬁts are from Sabelhaus (2000).
Figures 1.15, 1.16, and 1.17: Authors’ calculations as described in the text.
Figure 1.18: DB, DC, and 401(k) participants are from the Form 5500.
IRA and Keogh participants are from the IRS Statistics of Income.
Wage and Salary employment from the DOL web page.
Figure 1.19: Authors’ calculations from the SIPP.
Appendix B
The DB Loss Ratio from Dual Coverage Participants
The top panel oftable 1B.1shows the raw data, calculated from Form 5500
ﬁlings, that we use to estimate the DB loss ratio. The lower panel (third col-
umn) determines the additions to existing plans. The number of additional
participants to existing plans from years t to t   1 is simply the increase in
total participants, less the participants in plans just started that year. The
identity governing its evolution is:
number in 401(k) with a DB in year t   1 
  number in 401(k) with a DB in year t
  number in new 401(k) with a DB in year t   1 
  [(number in 401(k) with DB in t) 
  (DB coverage additions to existing 401(k)s)]   (DB loss rate)
The DB loss rate is the proportion of persons with a DB who drop (or lose)
the DB plan. Positive values of the loss rate indicate that some 401(k) par-
ticipants with DB coverage are moving to situations without such coverage.
We assume that among the additional participants in existing 401(k) plans,
the percent with a DB plan is the same as the percent with a DB in existing
plans in the prior year. The components of the loss ratio calculations are
shown in the last section of the table. DB denotes the number of workers
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with DB plans, Ndenotes the number in existing plans, Pthe proportion in
existing 401(k) plans with a DB plan (which equals the proportion of work-
ers added to existing 401(k) plans who have a DB plan), n the number of
workers in new plans, p the proportion in new plans with a DB plan, A the
number of additions to participants in existing plans, l the proportion of
those with a DB who drop the plan, and tthe year. The formula for the loss
ratio is then:
DBt 1   (N tP t   ntp t   nt 1p t 1)   (N tP t   ntp t   At 1P t)l
l  
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Comment Sylvester J. Schieber
This paper by Poterba, Venti, and Wise (hereafter PVW) documents the
substantial shift toward deﬁned contribution plans in the employer-based
segment of the U.S. retirement system in recent years. It suggests that sav-
ing through this element of the retirement system has increased as a result
of the shift toward deﬁned contribution pensions. It helps to explain what
has been a puzzle to many people regarding the decline in personal saving
rates recorded in recent years during a time that more and more people
have been saving through their deﬁned contribution plans.
This is an important paper because of the deliberations that are now
underway regarding potential changes in the structure of the U.S. Social
Security program. It is important because it indicates the direction the
market-based segment of our retirement system has taken over the past
twenty years or so and gives us some clues as to how people might react un-
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Sylvester J. Schieber is vice president of Watson Wyatt Worldwide.der some Social Security reform options now being discussed. It may also
show the way to reform Social Security so that workers will voluntarily put
more money into retirement savings, a potentially positive outcome given
underfunding of retirement programs today and the demographic de-
mands that they face.
My comments on this paper are limited to three points. First, I agree
with the authors’ general conclusion that the transition to personal ac-
counts has broadened the retirement security of many American workers;
however, I will argue the eﬀect has been skewed toward the more highly
paid. The evidence presented here and elsewhere suggests that this has oc-
curred more because of restrictions in plan coverage than because of work-
ers’, even those at lower wages, unwillingness to participate in contempo-
rary deﬁned contribution plans when oﬀered the opportunity. Second, I
will challenge the conclusion in the paper that the growth in reliance on de-
ﬁned contribution plans does not appear to have shrunk the level of de-
ﬁned beneﬁt provision in absolute terms. Finally, I will attempt to apply the
very positive results documented in this analysis to the contemporary de-
bate about how to reform Social Security.
The spectacular shift in the employer-sponsored retirement system since
the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in
1975 is probably as succinctly summarized by the relative shift in contri-
butions to plans as in any other way. Poterba, Venti, and Wise note that
contributions to private deﬁned beneﬁt plans varied widely between 1975
and 1999 but were essentially equivalent at the beginning and end of the
period. During this same time period, contributions to private deﬁned con-
tribution plans increased fourteenfold. At the end of the period, average
contributions per worker eligible to participate in 401(k) plans were much
greater than those being made to either deﬁned beneﬁt or deﬁned contri-
bution plans solely dependent on employer contributions.
Despite all of the good news in this paper, there is reason to be cautious
about the results presented in it. The major problem with our employer-
based segment of the retirement system is the relatively limited coverage
that it provides to certain segments of the workforce. For example, it is fre-
quently observed that only about half the U.S. workforce at any point in
time is participating in an employer-sponsored retirement plan. Figure
1C.1shows that workers at lower earnings levels have been much less likely
to participate in a plan than workers at higher earnings levels. The impli-
cations of the skewed participation in employer-sponsored plans are re-
ﬂected in table 6 of the PVW paper, where they show the results of simula-
tions of the potential retirement beneﬁts that will be available to people
retiring in 2035 by lifetime earnings.
I believe that PVW’s conclusion that the private deﬁned beneﬁt system is
“on its own track,” largely unaﬀected by the shift toward deﬁned contribu-
tion plans, deserves further scrutiny. The reason I believe this is that I am
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convinced the modiﬁcation of existing deﬁned beneﬁt plans in response to
the growth in supplementary deﬁned contribution plans has been greatly
delayed but is now underway. The 401(k) plans that most larger employers
sponsor today evolved from thrift-saving plans that they sponsored as sup-
plements to their deﬁned beneﬁt plans prior to the adoption of section
401(k) of the tax code. Employee contributions to these plans included no
tax incentives and participation in them was relatively low. In addition,
most of the plans had highly restricted investment options, often limiting
the investment of assets to money market or Guaranteed Investment Con-
tract (GIC) vehicles. The large employers that sponsored these plans had
traditionally structured their deﬁned beneﬁt plans around Social Security
and workers’ saving behavior with speciﬁc retirement income targets in
mind. The retirement income targets were set so workers could roughly
maintain their preretirement standards of living after they quit working.
Given the beneﬁts provided by Social Security and the employer’s deﬁned
beneﬁt plan, the estimated saving rates required on the part of various sorts
of workers could be determined. For example, one such set of estimated
saving rate requirements is shown in table 1C.1.
The estimated savings rates in this case were developed for workers cov-
ered by four diﬀerent deﬁned beneﬁt plans. These plans were selected from
a sample of some 560 plans on which Watson Wyatt had beneﬁt formulas
that allowed estimation of pension beneﬁts. From the whole set of plans,
Fig. 1C.1 Pension participation rates for workers with earnings under $50,000 per
year relative to those earning over $50,000 per year for selected years (amounts are
in 1998 dollars): Ratio of pension coverage rate to coverage rate of those earning
$50,000 or more
Source: Author’s calculations from supplement of the March Current Population Survey, var-
ious years.the four pension plans in the table were chosen from various points in the
array of generosity of beneﬁts provided. Someone covered by a very gen-
erous pension will not have to save as much in order to maintain preretire-
ment living standards after retirement as a worker in a more limited plan.
In the full analysis presented in McGill et al. (1996, chapters 18 and 19),
target saving rates were developed for workers starting at various ages un-
der their pension plans, retiring at various ages, and under a range of wage
growth and interest rate assumptions. The set of projections shown in table
1C.1 was developed under the assumption that workers would receive a
real return on their savings of 2 percent per year. The projections suggest
that workers at low wage levels under most pension plans sponsored by
large employers have faced relatively moderate saving requirements if they
worked until normal retirement age and received even a relatively conser-
vative return on their savings. Higher-wage workers would have to save
more, primarily because of the redistributive nature of Social Security.
Workers who wished to retire earlier would need to save at higher rates as
well. But the rates of saving that would be required outside of Social Secu-
rity and many of the pension plans that larger employers in the United
States have sponsored in the past are well within the range of saving that
goes on in most deﬁned contribution plans today.
Poterba, Venti, and Wise document that workers’ participation and con-
tribution rates in 401(k) plans are relatively high where plans are oﬀered.
In addition, in virtually all plans that exist today, workers get to choose
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Table 1C.1 Alternative Levels of DB Plan Generosity and the Estimated Savings Rates
Required to Maintain Preretirement Standards of Living from All Retirement
Income Sources for Workers Retiring at Age Sixty-ﬁve with Thirty Years of Service
Required Personal Savings Rate 
Associated with the Pension Plan at the:
Salary when Pension 15th 40th 65th 90th
Coverage and Saving Begins Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile
12,500 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
15,000 2.1 0.9 0.0 0.0
20,000 4.8 3.5 2.3 0.0
25,000 6.1 4.8 3.6 1.3
30,000 6.9 5.6 4.5 2.2
40,000 8.2 6.8 5.8 3.6
50,000 9.5 8.1 7.1 4.9
60,000 10.4 8.9 7.8 5.7
70,000 11.5 9.8 8.8 6.7
80,000 12.6 10.9 9.8 7.8
Source: McGill et al. (1996, 417).
Note: Sources of retirement income include Social Security, the employer deﬁned beneﬁt pension, and
income ﬁnanced through personal saving.where to invest their money from a broad range of investment options.
Much of the money in these plans is invested in ﬁnancial assets that have
paid much higher rates of return over time than was anticipated when
401(k) plans were ﬁrst established (see Clark et al. 2000; Clark and Schie-
ber 1998). The net result has been that the retirement portfolios oﬀered 
by many employers have proven to be more generous than anticipated by
both workers and their retirement plans sponsors. Until recently this was 
a fortuitous outcome to which plan sponsors paid little attention, but now
there are a combination of forces that I believe are motivating employers 
to reconsider their retirement plan oﬀerings. I believe the outcome of this
process is that the deﬁned beneﬁt side of the retirement portfolio will shrink
relative to the deﬁned contribution plans that are so widely prevalent.
Poterba, Venti, and Wise have documented the slowdown in funding of
deﬁned beneﬁt plans that arose because of various legislative actions taken
after the beginning of the 1980s. Schieber and Shoven (1997) have argued
that the aging of the workforce driven by the demographic composition of
the U.S. population will lead to increased funding requirements for deﬁned
beneﬁt plans as baby boom era workers approach retirement age. The front
edge of the baby boom generation is now turning ﬁfty-ﬁve, the age of early
retirement eligibility in many large deﬁned beneﬁt plans. Throughout the
latter part of the 1990s, the rapid escalation in pension asset values hid the
implications of the baby boomers’ aging, but recent ﬁnancial markets per-
formance is going to expose the resulting obligations that pension plan
sponsors face because of the funding slowdown that PVW identify. If em-
ployers do not curtail accruals in their deﬁned beneﬁt plans, many of them
are going to face much higher pension costs and funding requirements
than they are accustomed to.
Compounding the eﬀects of population aging on deﬁned beneﬁt pen-
sions are the same demographics implications for retiree health beneﬁts. In
addition, where employers can fund at least some of their pension obliga-
tions as they accrue, they have been much more limited by the law in their
ability to fund retiree health obligations. Retiree health beneﬁt costs and
obligations are expected to rise even more rapidly than those for deﬁned
beneﬁt pensions. As a result, many employers have begun to signiﬁcantly
curtail or completely eliminate their retiree health beneﬁt plans. As part of
that process, many are reassessing the complete portfolio of retirement
beneﬁts that they provide. In an era where management has become very
concerned about economic performance and limiting unexpected obliga-
tions, there is a natural tendency to shift away from the risks associated
with promises of future beneﬁts that cannot be fully funded as accrued.
The other major factor that has come into play in recent years is a very
tight labor market compared to what managers have traditionally faced.
Many employers that introduced early-retirement incentives into their de-
ﬁned beneﬁt plans did so in the 1970s or 1980s when the baby boomers
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growth rate in the 1990s was the lowest it had been since the 1950s (Lof-
gren, Nyce, and Schieber 2001). Indeed, very few managers still at work in
the latter half of the 1990s would have remembered such a tight labor mar-
ket in their working lives. By the end of the 1990s, the surplus labor phe-
nomenon that had led to the creation of early retirement incentives had
disappeared, and employers were beginning to consider ways to encourage
workers to extend their working lives. At least in part, this change in atti-
tude about keeping workers in the workforce until later in life helps to ex-
plain the shift to cash balance pensions or other types of hybrid pension
plans (see Brown et al. 1999; Clark and Schieber 2004). Virtually every de-
ﬁned beneﬁt plan that has been shifted to a new hybrid structure thus far
has included the elimination of the early retirement incentives that were in
the prior plan.
Although there have been several motivations for changing the structure
of deﬁned beneﬁt plans, the thing that has facilitated most employers do-
ing it has been the unexpectedly strong performance of their deﬁned con-
tribution plans. In that regard, the reaction of the deﬁned beneﬁt system to
the growing dependence on individual account plans has been greatly de-
layed. There was a slowdown in the conversion of traditional deﬁned ben-
eﬁt plans during 2000, but that was due largely to the strong negative reac-
tions to earlier plan conversions that garnered both press and political
attention. The underlying motivations for changing plans, however, have
not gone away. The size of the deﬁned contribution system today and the
robust participation in it by workers will continue to give employers an op-
portunity to adjust their deﬁned beneﬁt plans to accommodate their needs
to attract workers and control costs.
The ﬁnal element of my comment on the PVW paper pertains to what we
might learn from our 401(k) experience that would enlighten the discus-
sion about Social Security reform. Ideally, our experience with individual
account plans might help us to devise a way of reforming the system that
would at once resolve the Social Security funding shortfalls and enhance
retirement security for today’s workers. President George W. Bush has sug-
gested that we should reform Social Security by diverting a portion of the
current payroll taxes into individual accounts. He has set down as prin-
ciples that the new program not reduce beneﬁts for people currently retired
or close to retirement and that the existing commitment to disability in-
surance be maintained. He has said that participation in the revised plan
will be voluntary and that it is not to be ﬁnanced by new taxes.
The reason that Social Security is underfunded in the future is that cur-
rent tax rates supporting the system cannot sustain the program if current
retirement patterns persist into the future. Although virtually no one who
has studied the program quibbles with this conclusion, there seems to be a
tremendous reluctance on the part of policymakers to raise payroll tax
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ing retirement ages or implementing other universal beneﬁt cuts. Despite
the popular belief in some circles that setting up and funding individual ac-
counts will solve the problem without having to invoke other tax increases
or beneﬁt reductions, the eﬀects of funding will not occur rapidly enough
or be suﬃcient to oﬀset the projected underfunding in the system. Unless
we are willing to cut beneﬁts or raise taxes, it would seem that the laws of
arithmetic dictate that we will have to put more money into the system
from some other sources. That is where the 401(k) experience documented
by PVW is instructive.
Consider for the sake of discussion a modiﬁed version of the plan that
was put forward by Schieber and Shoven (1999) that they labeled
PSA2000. Their original plan called for the creation of mandatory Per-
sonal Security Accounts (PSAs) as part of Social Security reform. This
modiﬁed version of the PSA2000 proposal would allow workers to make a
voluntary contribution of up to 2.5 percent of their pay to their PSA. For
each dollar that the worker contributed to the account, Social Security
would match it dollar for dollar. This would essentially replicate the way
many employers sponsor and structure their 401(k) plans.
We know how people behave under 401(k) plans and might expect that
they would behave somewhat similarly under this version of a PSA plan. In
a prior paper to the one under review here, PVW (1998, 181) used Current
Population Survey data to estimate that 71 percent of eligible workers dur-
ing 1993 participated in a 401(k) or similar plan. Clark et al. (2000, 100)
used administrative data on a sample of eighty-seven 401(k) plans to show
that 79 percent of workers eligible to participate in them did so during
1995. Where the participation rates fall oﬀ in a way that would be of con-
cern in considering a voluntary PSA proposal is at lower earnings levels, es-
pecially among younger workers. Getting workers with relatively low earn-
ings to participate at nearly universal levels in voluntary retirement savings
plans, especially very young ones, would likely take more than just a direct
match of their contributions.
Once workers are motivated to participate in 401(k) plans, their contri-
bution rates are signiﬁcant as shown in table 1.2. Poterba, Venti, and Wise
(1998, 181) found that in 1993, contributions by families participating in
401(k) plans averaged 8.7 percent of salary, with employee contributions
accounting for roughly two-thirds of the total, and employer matching
making up the rest. They also found little variation in contribution rates
across the earnings spectrum. Clark et al. (2000, 104), using plan adminis-
tration data, found that the average employee contribution in the eighty-
seven plans they studied was 6.9 percent of the worker’s wages. The lowest
contribution rates reported in this latter study were 4.4 percent of pay for
workers in their twenties earning under $25,000 in 1995. Even workers at
the lowest earnings levels and at the youngest ages tend to contribute at
The Transition to Personal Accounts and Increasing Retirement Wealth 77rates signiﬁcantly above the 2.5 percent level that would be allowed in the
national voluntary PSA plan posited here for discussion purposes.
Poterba, Venti, and Wise’s work and other independent research leads to
the conclusion that a voluntary saving program that allowed workers to
contribute up to 2.5 percent of pay to an individual account where Social
Security matched it on a dollar-for-dollar basis would entice a large ma-
jority of workers to participate in the plan. These studies also suggest that
if a 100 percent match on contributions was proﬀered, those who entered
on their own would likely take advantage of the whole match oﬀered to
them. One way to address the natural tendency of workers at low earnings
levels to forego participation in voluntary retirement saving plans is to pro-
vide them with a tax credit to help them participate in a national voluntary
PSA plan of the type outlined here. For example, it might be desirable to
give a full credit for any worker whose annual covered earnings were less
than or equal to full-time employment at the national minimum wage. To
limit its costs, the tax credit could be phased out on a sliding scale up to an
annual earnings level at twice that amount. Such a tax credit clearly would
make the plan redistributional toward lower-wage workers consistent with
the current structure of Social Security. This should result in virtually uni-
versal participation by workers with earnings up to $20,000 per year. If we
estimate that 90 percent of the workers above that would buy in on their
own, which is consistent with Clark et al. (2000), a plan of this sort could
end up with 95 percent or more of all workers participating on a voluntary
basis. It would all be voluntary but would potentially be bringing a great
deal of new savings into the system. Creation of a program of this sort on
a national basis would not only oﬀer the potential of bringing additional
resources to bear on solving the Social Security ﬁnancing problem, it
would also greatly expand the availability of a 401(k) type vehicle to work-
ers who have traditionally been left out of this powerful retirement saving
opportunity.
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